



## **Security Challenges in Nigeria: Performance of the Military in the War against Boko-Haram Insurgency in Nigeria**

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### **ABSTRACT**

In any civilized society, one of the major responsibilities of government, if not the most important, is the safeguarding of the welfare and security of its citizens. The Islamist insurgency group remains an enduring threat to North Eastern Nigeria even as the country possesses military capacity and threat of force to sustain peace in the society. This paper reviews Boko Haram activities and security management in Nigeria and, Nigeria's national security system. It also analyses the conceptual clarification of war and the level of success or failure of the military in the fight against Boko Haram radical in Nigeria. The paper engaged qualitative methods and broadly made utilize of secondary source of information such as internet, newspapers, journals, and recorded data. Findings revealed that, a fair level of success has been achieved by the military in the quest against Boko Haram insurgency especially, in this present administration. Thus, the paper concluded that the military has achieved a remarkable success, but the series of recent bombings that we experience in some North Eastern states are some reasons that the military needs to cover more ground in terms of sustaining peace and security in those areas.

**Keywords:** Boko-Haram, Military, Military Intelligence, Security, War.

### **INTRODUCTION**

The drift of guerrilla in Nigeria as exemplified by the evil exercises of the feared Islamic faction prevalently known as Boko-Haram has ended up as a major concern to the universal communities in common and the Nigerian government in specific (Awofeso and Ebirim, 2017).

The intellectual discourse and research on insurgency or terrorism, especially in respect of Boko-Haram insurgency, engenders mainly by the incessant killings of Nigerians and sometimes the inordinate claims by the government and military institutions to have decimated the activities of the sect in the North-East, Nigeria. But the continued killings and recent strategies deployed by this sect, aimed at the killing of Nigerian soldiers and carting away their weapons, which have invariably led to frequent change in the commanders of war theatre in Maiduguri have thus provoked studies (Onuoha, 2012 and Walker, 2016) aimed at reversing such trends or ugly scenario given the immense role that can be played in national security by the military. In Nigeria, the several military strategies, collaborations and intelligence have been enunciated and implemented in a bid to win the war against Boko-Haram insurgency. Of all government interventions and strategies deliberately put in place to address problems of Boko-Haram insurgency, through affirmative action, the relocation of the military Headquarter or base to Maiduguri where the insurgents are predominant by President Buhari occupies a pride of place (Yahaya, 2015).

Regardless of the nature and extent of defects that may characterize this decision, it has, for quite some time, made the military more pro-active and achieve some remarkable results in terms of re-claiming local governments and territories under the ambit of this deadly sect (Omomia, 2015). Not unexpectedly, the performance of the military in the war against Boko Haram insurgency has been subjected to various critical analysis (Shuiabu, 2015).

Though, not much academic and intellectual resource has been contributed in examining the performance of the military in the war against Boko-Haram insurgency in Nigeria. The main issue which this study addressed itself to, in an exploratory way, look at success or failure of the military within the context of ending Boko-Haram guerrilla in Nigeria. The study is interested in knowing whether the military has been successful in winning the war against Boko-Haram insurgency. If yes, to what extent has the military sustain the level of success over the sect? If not, what options are available to the military?

### **Conceptual Clarification: War**

In order to understand what war is, one must understand who makes war, as well as how and why they go to war. Clausewitz (1976) describes war as "nothing but a duel on a bigger scale" and more totally that war is an act of drive to compel our adversary to do the will of others. According to him, an indeed more comprehensive definition of war is that it could be a struggle between or among States and state like substances for political control over individuals, domain, or resources. This definition covers all the questions of who, what and why and as long as one deciphers strife as savage drive, and as how as well. Clausewitz (1991) defines war as "an act of savagery planning to compel our openness to fulfil our will", and somewhere else work out the progression of war with other political strategies: "War is nothing but a continuation of political intercut, with a blend of other means". On Sorel (1912) perception, war is characterized as a " political art by means of which states, incapable to alter a debate with respect to their commitments, rights or interests, resorts to implement to choose which is the more grounded and may to subsequently force its will on the other".

Kallen (1939) appears to support political definition of war when he composes that war may be characterized as an armed challenge between two or more imperial institutions utilizing organised military powers within the interest of particular ends. He advance that this organisation of the fighting arm forces expands back behind the battle lines and tends in cutting edge wars to grasp all civilian activities, such as the industrial, productive and commercial, additionally the social interests and person demeanours. He went further to criticize Clausewitz" (1911) definition of war as "an act of savagery for the reason of forcing the adversary to do what we want" as well common and uncertain. Furthermore, he states that, this definition might be useful especially when applied in sports, commerce and finance. It might apply to anybody's act of savagery, at whatever point it happens. As restricted to war, it applies to pre-Napoleonic and pre-industrial time and eagerly, when war was a castle venture, at the gentleman's game.

Johnson (1935) characterizes war as "outfitted clashes between populace groups' conceived of as natural solidarities, like races or tribes, states or lesser geographic units, religious or political parties, and financial classes". The definition made by Bernard (1944), is regarded as roughly sociological since it doesn't constrain the outfitted strife to political units but incorporates any sort of populace units which is in a position of turning to arms as a strategy of settling disputes. Maybe the definition is just too common, since it doesn't indicate the length of the clashes or size of the clashing parties. As it stands, this definition is often made to incorporate riots.

Russell's (1916) definition of war as "struggle between two different groups in which each endeavors to slaughter and mutilate as numerous as conceivable in order to realize its objectives needed" is indeed more common and uncritically comprehensive. Additionally, Russell states the reason which made men battles as "common control of riches". Wallace (1968) sees war to be the authorized utilize of deadly weapons by individuals in a society against another individuals in another society. It is carried out by prepared people working in groups that are coordinated by a separate policy-making group and bolstered in different ways by non-combatants populace".

Ashworth (1968) views war to be a sort of equipped struggle between nation-states in which populaces and assets are reasonably and broadly composed for victory, because it is vital to note that populaces immobilized both in terms of exercises and mental states. While the previous suggests comprehensive military and civilian conscriptions, the last mentioned suggests the precise advancement of bellicose and unfriendly demeanours towards the adversary among the populace. On the part of Deutsch and Senghaas (1971) war implies genuine large-scale organised savagery, arranged and maintained by the compulsion and authenticity claims of a State and its government, and coordinated against another State or quasi-State, i.e. a generally comparable political organization.

Barringer (1972) considers war to be "one conceivable mode of approach movement pointed at successfully and favourably settling a continuous struggle of interests. In this sense, war is but one of various clashes strategies, others being transaction, conciliation, intercession, discretion, and arbitration, as witnessed in Nigeria and other countries. It's just a specific subset of the larger set of all clashes modes, enveloping all the socially (if not legitimately) recognized circumstances in which equipped dangers of significant size are conducted on a orderly and proceeding premise by the outfitted powers of two or more political groups, organizations, governments and countries. Since the word "war" has legitimate suggestions and no political body cares any longer to endure or hazard freely, the de facto circumstance of war will be alluded to as "dangers".

### **Typologies of War**

Wright (1942; 1965) created and recognizes four (4) types and categories of war: (i) the respectful war, which happens within the territory of a country; (ii) the adjust of control war, in which individuals of a State are at war among each other; (iii) the protective war, which protects a civilization against the interruptions of an outsider culture; (iv) lastly is the majestic war, where one civilization endeavours to extend at the cost others. In this set of refinements, the boundary conditions of the struggle show up as the essential criteria of classification. Whether a battle is classified as a majestic or respectful battle, clearly relies upon the degree to which the strife is contained within, or expanded beyond, sure boundaries, suggesting the presence of each structural separation and interest (Midlarsky, 1975). Little and Kraft (1965) take after Wright's type in recognizing among respectful, colonial and universal wars, however with a great focused accentuation in that wars between civilizations aren't not unequivocally presented.

Luard (1968) presents a rather distinctive point of view in his remedy of war; he places more noteworthy accentuation at the notion techniques of Nation-States of their initiation of war, despite of the fact that implicit in those motives for extension are the ideas of complexity and cooperation. Luard separates "Wars of Aggression" into four (4) categories. Broad wars are characterised as the ones involved with the "conquest of foreign territories not already controlled". The Japanese intrusions of Manchuria and China are cases of this sort, as are the German and Soviet intrusions of different European nations within the interwar period. Irredentist wars, as stated by Luard, "directed against regions occupied primarily by the individuals of the equal race as the conquerors".

The Nazi occupations of Austria and the Sudetenland have a place in this category. Strategic wars, as a third category, can be propelled through a need as the part of a country to improve its calculated and military function vis-à-vis a few genuine or envisioned risk. The Soviet attack of Finland in 1939 may also have been initiated through this type of visible risk, and the Israeli support within the Suez campaign could have been essentially persuaded. Additionally, Luard talks of coercive wars as the ones which involve the setting of limitations on the operations of sovereign government. Finally, Luard used the Middle Easterner intrusion of Israel in 1948 and the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian rebellion in 1956 as examples.

Midlarsky (1975) created a category of wars, primarily based totally on a mixture of the premises of rank, order and scope, in conjunction with the unequivocal utilize of the factors "structural differentiation" and "participation". Additionally, two (2) factors particular of political violence are involved. These are the concentrated of viciousness within the shape of the number killed, and term, as a worldly marker. Lastly, the inspiration of performing artists is taken under consideration.

**Table 1: Varieties Of War**

<b>Type of war</b>	<b>Structural differentiation (a)</b>	<b>Participation (b)</b>	<b>War duration</b>	<b>No. killed</b>	<b>Motivation of at least one set of protagonists</b>
Normative	High	High	Long	Exceptionally high	Essential change within the approach system within countries and in the universal system
Coercive	Moderate	Generally moderate	Moderate	High	Essential change within the approach system in countries and within a specific region
Regional	Low to moderate	Moderate generally	Moderate	Low to moderate	Direct changes in a territorial approach system
Territorial	Very low	Restricted to two	Short to moderate	Low to moderate	Regional change

**Source: Midlarsky (1975), On War: Political Savagery within the Universal System, Free Press, New York.**

**The Military, Military Intelligence and the Nigeria’s Security Challenges**

Robert (1993) clarifies that military may be a drive authorized to utilize deadly or dangerous constrain and weapons to bolster the interface of the state and all of its citizens, and it ordinarily comprises of Armed force, Naval force, Air Force, and in certain nations the Marines and Coast Guard. Besides, the assignment of the military is ordinarily characterized as defense of the state and its citizens, and the indictment of war against another state. The military may also have extra endorsed and non-sanctioned capacities inside a society counting, the advancement of political plan, securing corporate financial interests, internal populace control, development, crisis administrations, social ceremonies and guiding critical areas. Dupuy (1990) distinguished four dynamic branches of the Military to incorporate armed force which is the most seasoned department of the Military; the Armed Force secures the security of Nigerians and its assets. The Marine Corps work closely with the Naval Force, the Marine Corps is routinely essential on the ground in combat circumstances. The Naval force protects the right to travel and exchange unreservedly on the world’s seas and secures national interface abroad. The Air Force secures Nigerians interface at home and overseas with a center on air power. Dupuy further clarify that, each department also have a reserve component, as these service individuals get the same training as their active-duty peers but do so near home until they are required to deploy.

David (2005) explains that, the military is the group or groups of individuals that are given control to guard something (generally a nation). While the military can be ordered by the government of the nation to assault another nation, they also secure the nation by protecting it from the armed forces of adversaries, in the event that there's a war. The word "military" comes from the Latin miles, which means warrior. Significantly, why there are numerous occupations to do in a military, a few occupations are for fighting and a few for other works to support the military. A few things individuals do within the military are the utilization of weapons, driving vehicles and repair weapons. Other individuals within the military learn how to fly airplane, pilot ships or repair engines. David continued that individuals within the military usually wear clothes called a uniform, whereas in a few places, particularly where there may be combat, a uniform regularly comes in a camouflage pattern which is designed to create the individual difficult to see within the forest or desert. Moreover, he recognizes two ways to connect the military: the primary is that

individuals connect the military since they want to, while the second is that, there are laws that a few individuals need to be within the military, indeed in the event that you do not need to be.

Accessible prove to proposes that insights exercises in post-colonial Nigeria took shape with the foundation of the Nigeria Security Organisation (NSO) by means of declare No. 16 of 1976 (Peters, 1986). As it were, the NSO was to combine the obligations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the USA which involved counterintelligence exercises and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Peters, 1986). It was headed by Director-General who was a member of the Supreme Military Council and the National Security and Defence Council. Be that as it may, as contended by Peters (1986), "the body not only needed intelligence specialist, but also needed clearly characterized objectives" (report of the Committee on Police Affairs of the House of Representatives on the Nigerian Police Force in 1982).

By 1984, a Directorate of Insights was set up within the office of the Chief of Staff. It's had four directors in three (3) years of presence (Oladoyin, 1985). Unexpectedly, within the same period, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) was also set up in the office of the Minister of Defence. Clearly, from the start, it appeared that a clash of interface was inevitable and seem rub off on effectiveness. By 1986, decree No.19 (under Rtd, General Ibrahim Babangida administration) formally nullified the NSO and made the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the State Security Service (SSS) (Oladoyin, 1985). By ideals of arrangements of this decree, it implied that the intelligence agency had gotten to be decentralized. The State Security Benefit got to be saddled with the obligation of anticipation and discovery which in Nigeria of any wrongdoing against internal security, protection and conservation of all non-military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria and such other obligations affecting internal security within the country, including the Armed Forces Ruling Council or the President, Commander - in - Chief of the Armed Forces as the case may be, may consider fundamental. (Peters, 1986).

Unfortunately, the security challenges that have confronted the nation since the dawn of the Twenty-first Century, particularly since the upsurge within the psychological militant exercises of the Boko Haram faction since 2011, appear to deliver the impression that the intelligence department of the Armed Forces has gone to "sleep". This is often regrettable since the coherence of killings as has been experienced within the recent past portends nothing positive but hovel grave peril to the Nigeria nation state. Psychological warfare, no question, could be a worldwide risk to peace but government must battle it head-long and this requires political will. Conflicts, where unchecked would lead to dangers of incredible measurement as happenings in other climes have appeared.

Recently, commentators on the expanded threat of radical in the nation have cautioned against the probability of that division of the nation, but the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Buhari Muhammad, has reliably guaranteed the citizens that radical would be brought under control. In any case, it is vital to draw the consideration of the time-honoured saying that "avoidance is superior to remedy". This underscores the reason why efforts ought to be more on how to check the act that soothes when pulverization has been made. In reality, from the examination of researchers, three levels of exercises that may evoke war are: person level in which "awful" choices by pioneers, communication failure and misperceptions; societal level in which there's ethno national challenges and the perseverance of political agitation - all of which are signs of peril ahead of the Country (The Nation, Lagos, August 6, 2013, Pp 2-3)".

### **Nigeria's National Security System**

National security has been one of the key interfaces within the studies of international relations and strategic studies. By and large, definitions of national security have been approximately ensuring the states and their citizens from dangers and threats and the capacity to continue on center values (Yong, 2011). In Nigeria's setting, national security is concerned with securing the lives and property of Nigerian's, protecting her sway, territoriality and its economy, and improving socio-cultural and political concordance. To realize these goals, the concept of total security was embraced for Nigeria's defense and security by Federal Government. Total security comprises three components - Total defence, Diplomacy and Internal security. Total defence is the foundation of Nigeria's deterrence procedure, because it gives

the system for a comprehensive and coordinates reaction to bargain with all sorts of dangers and challenges including global psychological warfare, national security emergency like Boko Haram and the Niger Delta militancy, and economic crisis. The following key segments of the society - Military, Civil, Economic, Social and Psychological Defence, from the center intrigued zones of Nigeria's national security. While, responsive defence aims at joining together all pertinent government offices, private division organizations and all Nigerians within the resistance of the nation. With the above it is anticipated that, any potential attacker who takes on the Nigeria Armed Forces (NAF) would need to confront the impressive errand of taking all Nigerians (Bassey and Dokubo, 2011). It has however, been contended that total defence, diplomacy and deterrence, as national guard and security approaches, are inadequately to guarantee the security of the Nigerian state and ineffectual in accomplishing the national security objectives.

Other security examiners have fought that the current security challenges going up against the Nigeria state is able of making the nation permeable for internal and external subversion and insurrection. Hence, they have called for more rigid security measures and approaches instead of being saddled with peace-keeping operations in other nations while missing the capacity to bargain with inside security emergency, clashes and pressures. (Dixon, 2012; Azazi, 2012).

### **Boko Haram Activities and Security Management in Nigeria**

Since 2009, there are numerous publications listing the biggest attacks by Boko Haram. Abimbola and Adesote (2012) quoted a Nigerian newspaper in the compilation of the Boko Haram attack from July 26, 2009 to April 30, 2012. Boko Haram radical has gotten to be so uncontrolled that it has for all intents and purposes become an everyday issue, with the group randomly chooses where and when to operate and slaughter thousands of innocent people in their daily life.

Attacks by Boko Haram included a 2011 Christmas bombings that killed 45 individual in a bomb explosion in three (3) states: Niger, Plateau and Yobe. In January 2012, three (3) armed groups and suicide bombers helped attack Kano's three (3) government agencies, police base camps, Immigration bureaus, and national security bureaus. In March 2012, 12 public schools in Maiduguri were burnt down late at night, with up to 10,000 students dropped out of school. In June 2011, Boko Haram bombed Abuja's police headquarters with a car stacked with explosives, on the grounds of the Louis Edet House, an office block already reserved for security considerations in the Abuja government area. In August 2011, a member of the sect drove a car to a United Nations facility in Abuja, and detonates a huge bomb, killing 23 persons and injuring dozens (Alao, 2012). On the night of April 14, 2014, Boko Haram surprised the world by abducting more than 200 young schoolgirls from a state owned high school in Chibok Borno. Despite tremendous opposition following the activities around the world and offers of support from the United States, United Kingdom and France, the discharge of all female students is yet to be secured after 7 years. Boko Haram's attempted terrorist strategy has succeeded in undermining Nigeria's political leadership and security authority; the goals that, the group has continuously stated since 2009. The violent campaign spread the fear and frailty that the fear of Boko Haram can really be said to be the dawn of wisdom for most Nigerians, especially those living in the northeast as well as the whole northern part of the country.

The reaction of the government has been transcendently military, with the Joint Task Force (JTF) being station in the North East, for a long time now. The profession of state of crisis within the influenced states in the North East has similarly fizzled to abdicate significant dividend. In December 2012, Jonathan met with the US Africa Commands (AFRICOM) General Carter Ham and re-requested security segment help to support Nigeria's counterterrorism efforts focusing on Boko Haram. General Ham was detailed to have concurred to collaborate with Jonathan within the frame of police fortifications along the border with Cameroon to re-strict the unlawful importation of explosives and weapons (Copeland, 2013). Unfortunately, such cooperation was not recognized until after the snatching of the Chibok young school girls by Boko Haram. The government's response has been much more military, along with the long-standing Joint Task Force (JTF) in the northeast. Crisis commitments within the affected north-eastern states also failed with the abandonment of significant dividends. In December 2012, Jonathan met with

General Carter Ham of the United States, Africa Command (AFRICOM) and called on security forces to support Nigeria's anti-terrorism efforts focused on Boko Haram. General Ham reportedly agreed to work with Jonathan on a police fortress along the border with Cameroon to curb the illegal import of explosives and weapons (Copeland, 2013). Unfortunately, such collaboration was not recognized until Boko Haram kidnapped a young Chibok schoolgirl.

The activities of the JTF in the northeast have received serious criticism from an independent and universal group. Analysts at Amnesty International point out that there are two fundamental flaws in the Nigerian government's approach. First, the brutal concealment of the group, including a series of extrajudicial executions, represented a clear violation of the rule of law, backfired in the north. Efforts by a federal-appointed committee to initiate negotiations with Boko Haram were also premature in 2013 after the group said it was reluctant to negotiate and the federal government was not in a position to pardon them. The group claimed that they were carrying out Allah's orders, and such can allow the federal government acquittal. Furthermore, the Nigerian border is not consistently controlled. Immigration and other agencies are understaffed, underfunded and unequipped to assign feasible staff to frontier workers. It is useful to note that of the 4,080 immigration routes to the country, only 91 are officially approved and staffed by the Immigration Bureau and other authorities. What that means is that there are many means that psychological militants and other criminal factors can use to enter the country without being disturbed by security agencies. This reveals why the terrorist group Boko Haram added several communities and declared their "caliphate state" after working to attack villages and towns from Cameroon.

Unverified media coverage has had a negative impact on the Boko Haram Group's possession of more advanced military equipment than the Nigerian Army. The allegations appear to be somewhat similar to the military's long-standing failure to conquer terrorists. Nigeria's military and security agencies are underfunded, unequipped and unwilling to secure a country. The military and law enforcement agencies do not have a solid life protection package, despite the dangerous nature of their profession. Reportedly, 500,000 naira unrelated to the families of the killed officers were paid, but their promise to pay was not immediately fulfilled. This acts as a deterrent, as they cannot bear giving their lives for a country that does not actually take care of their families when they are absent.

### **The Level of Success or Failure of the Military in the Fight against Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria**

Security challenges without a doubt are dangers to the social, financial and political stability in Africa landmass, especially in Nigeria. There's no question that poor administration, ineffective and inefficient leadership and, corruptions at all levels of administration are a few of the variables that might have contributed to Nigeria's security circumstances nowadays. (Adambazau, 2014). Without a doubt, what's the existing drift of savagery is engraving on the mind of Nigerians is that, the equipped powers and other branches security device is unfit of ensuring the security, assurance and security of its people and properties. Hence, what this will effect on human security is that it'll advance fear, while at the same time constraining the peoples' capacity to create financially (Okolo, 2009). The exercises of the Boko Haram has been a major challenge to partners of Nigeria's national security organizations such as the civil defense, police, state service security, the military, and other security operatives. These security operators need workable counter-terrorism approach, as all their responsive security molecules are essentially insufficient in guaranteeing a feasible administration and determination of a value-based insurrection (Ngele and Ukandu, 2012).

Indubitably, Agbiboa and Mainganwa (2014) addressed other deteriorating security conditions in northern Nigeria in a "flip-flop" approach from the Nigerian government's dialogue to pardoning Boko Haram members and deploying troops. He claims that dissatisfaction is rising and proclamation of war against Boko Haram was within a month. This is properly pointed out by Siollun (2015).

"The government's previous methods appeared to be schizophrenia, promising to 'crush' Boko Haram, calling for negotiations with them, and swaying between offering amnesty. The government's approach was to say the right thing at the wrong time or to do the right thing in the wrong way. Military power and negotiations are part of the solution, but amnesty should be the end, not the beginning of the dispute resolution process".

The Nigerian government has been criticized at home and abroad for its inadequate and ineffective response to Boko Haram's malicious activities. Amnesty International claims that Nigerian authorities have warned of an attack on Chibok but have not taken the necessary security measures. Some attacks on the school are being carried out by Boko Haram sects and this has become a staple. For example, in July 2013, 46 schoolboys were killed in an attack in the same area of Nigeria. The police who are primarily responsible for internal security in Nigeria have failed as they have been overwhelmed by the rising wave of insurgency because they lack essential training and expertise in counter-insurgency operations (Odomovo, 2014).

In many cases, the structure and mission of military power is inconsistent with national security challenges. The Nigerian Armed Forces, in its view, are traditional troops, focusing on external enemies and engaging in peacekeeping operations for the African Union and United Nations. However, the military has been forced into a domestic security role because police and other elements of Nigerian security forces are unable to conquer Boko Haram, and are not equipped and trained to do so. At times, the military's stubborn response to sects' attacks killed several civilians and made many people in northern Nigeria afraid of the military (ACLED, 2015). In addition, the presentation of hit-and-run and bombing guerrilla strategies captured the Nigerian army as a guide because the Nigerian army was outside the scope of preparation and creativity. This was in favour of the enemy and gave the victims of unpunished targets the opportunity to carry out their vicious acts of terrorism (Vanguard, November 25, 2012). The apparently poor condition of the Nigerian army can be a major problem in Nigeria. Many recognize that the military has needed to learn how to combat terrorism and that civilian governments have curtailed their investment in defense, leaving behind notable capabilities in the last decade. The military power is currently only 144,000. (Guardian of Nigeria, November 12, 2014) said:

"Historically, the nation's outfitted powers have notoriety for valour and enthusiastic efforts. What is happening nowadays in this manner is heart-rending and the destitute reflection of the past picture and character of the men and ladies naturally charged with shielding the country's regional judgment from inside and outside animosity. But in spite of current difficulties, the nation has the assets and fortitude to battle the Boko Haram insurgents. What is required is the political ability and technique to indict the war".

In this regard, as with the local community, government agencies must take responsibility for it. Nigerian troops operating in the northeast are involved in a decline in the state of emergency, and information about it could underestimate morale, escape, and more recently rebellion, coupled with resource needs and reports of failed equipment. It has been suggested that deployed units operate for less than \$ 100 million annually. This is the highest national budget since the Nigerian Civil War compared to today's \$ 2 billion central allocation fund. Although there are reports of military deployments being absent or slow, senior Abuja officials and temporary workers have also reportedly earned significant budgetary income from the modern war against fear-based oppression in Nigeria (Pérouse, 2014). Ilevbare (2014), states that the Nigerian army is still playing a role in demonstrating its ability to quell the rebellion.



“The military's symmetric approach to an asymmetric counter-terrorism fight in states beneath crisis has fizzled. The spate of nearly day by day assaults on defenseless civilians underscores this point. These thoughtless killings from exceedingly organized, luxuriously financed bunches pursuing insurgents' war frequently from inside civilian populace utilize both conventional and present day weapons”.

The introduction of politics into security issues was not supportive, but served as a risk to the country's survival, peace and security. Although both the government and some northern state governments are using billions of naira (20% of their annual budget) as part of their security vote to address Boko Haram and other related threats, Police and military officers are generally ambushed by militant groups (Shuriye et al, 2013). Security forces are unable to regularly identify the people behind riots and other cases of violence, and theories of political inclusion, bribery, and corruption are widespread (Persson, 2014).

On the ground, Nigerian troops are gaining weight to put an end to guerrillas. However, frontline troops regularly mourn the need for proper weapons and equipment. This issue is currently included in the military warranty. Logistics of armed groups raises serious problems. According to some reports, security forces have helicopters carrying food and materials to them (Nigeria Guardian, November 12, 2014). Inhabitants living in towns attacked by Islamic attackers confirmed reports of poor Nigerian army equipment, and rebels armed with rocket-propelled projectiles and anti-aircraft weapons on trucks, and in some cases armoured pods. In contrast, Nigerian officers may elaborate on the lack of ammunition and being sent to bushes to fight without essential communication hardware.

Besides, there were parcel of episodes that happened while officers are battling the group that uncovered the shortcoming of Nigerian security for handling the danger of the group. For instance, on 14th May 2014, a few of the front line soldiers battling the group in Maiduguri endeavoured a revolt by firing on their commanding officer. The Nigeria military officers had complained that the insurgents outgun them as a result of more modern weapons utilized by the sect members. This issue appears endemic corruption inside the Nigerian security framework, where billions of naira was apportioned to defence service for the battle against terrorism, but the result has not yielded any accomplishments. In a related issue, a group of soldiers battling the group in Maiduguri had denied to go to the front line until cutting edge weapons are given to them (Shuaibu et Al 2015). Meanwhile, as asserted by Falana (2014).

"The veritable demands for equipment types and installment payments and payment of deployment funds for individual members of the military are considered treason by military authorities. Twelve officers who participated in the opposition to General Officer Commanding were charged with rebellion and sentenced to death. Many others are now witnessing a military law conference rebellion. The concerned spouses of soldiers who discredited the arrangement of their husbands on self-destructive missions have been debilitated with infusion for military barracks by the Chief of Armed force Staff”.

Waddington (2014) finds it difficult to assess Nigeria's military action against Boko Haram. This is due to the long-standing tendency of military authorities to distort aftermath reports, limiting media access to military operations. As a counter-terrorism measure, the Nigerian Army has proven clumsy and regularly retaliates, but has not succeeded in using information to proactively counter future terrorist attacks. In addition, the Nigerian Army has a long history of human rights abuses due to rebellion, beginning with illegal detention, torture and extrajudicial executions. Such an act may have failed to stop Boko Haram and may have given further support to the group.

### **Theoretical Framework**

After careful consideration of the subject of the study, it became essential to adopt a theoretical framework that would serve as a guide for the explanation, analysis, interpretation, and prediction of the phenomenon. In this regard, structural-functionalism theory will be our operational guide to this study. Structural functionalism is an outgrowth of system theory, the approach distinguishes and looks at the

structures and functions which they perform for the system maintenance (Akindele, Obiyan and Owoeye, 2000). Functionalism got to be vital when Darwin's evolutionary theories of 1859 started to impact considering approximately human conduct. Darwin conceived of the thought of survival in functional terms. While each function was imperative to the total framework, framework that might not adjust their capacities ceased to exist. Other understudy of human conduct borrowed these thoughts, applying them to social issues. In this way, social Darwinism imported the same functionalist categories into social investigation. Social Darwinist claimed that society profited from imtemperate competition between units, that functional versatility was required for survival, which endeavor to ensure the powerless hampered the working society as an entirety.

In spite of the fact that, structural-functionalism has been criticized incompletely because of its accentuation on framework maintenance by which it is said to be steady of the status quo instead of alter. A few studies of structural-functionalism have showed up within the writing of political science, a few have emphasized the challenges "system," its boundaries and its common internal configurations (Groth, 1970). Some have sent the political inclinations understood within the whole approach insofar to center on harmony, solidness, and survival as verifiable system- distinguishing political wellbeing either with status quo maintenance progressive changes, and radical, progressive changes with the system pathology (Sklar, 1967). It underlines the useful part in maintaining the framework a entire. Hence, structural functionalism empowers a clear conception approximately the part of the different structures. From the structural-functionalism we come to know around the operational function of the military to incorporate security

The Nigerian military comprises the Armed Force, Naval Force and Air Force, and its essential order is to protect the state from outside animosity and inside insurrection. Be that as it may, before long after freedom in 1960, it stifled a secessionist offered by the previous Eastern region which announced itself the Republic of Biafra in 1967. Since the 1960s, it has contributed to a few inside security operations, helping the police and other gracious specialists to re-establish law and open arrange, and it has moreover contributed considerably to UN peacekeeping operations, territorial peace operations authorized by the Financial Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and operations ordered by the African Union (AU). However, the military has been in step decrease in the last decade, its failure to repress the insurgency by aggressor groups within the Niger Delta cleared out the government with no alternative other than to offer the aggressors a pardon in 2009. In 2012, it was incapable to convey for front-line operations beneath

On the war against the Boko Haram insurgency, the military has performed fairly because of the underfunding, indiscipline of some of the military personnel, and non-corporation of members of the society in revealing information about Boko Haram terrorist in the North East. However, this does not mean that the military as an institution has not been effective in the fights against the Boko Haram. For instance, prior to the 2015 elections, the military ensures that elections were held within the war/crises influenced states within the North East. They were able to repel the terrorists and claimed some of the local governments captured by the insurgents. Within six (6) weeks to the election, there were records of success of the exploit of the military in the North East, particularly during 2015 general elections. Following this achievement, at the inception of Buhari administration, the president immediately order the military service chiefs back into the war zones, that is, relocating the military headquarters to Maiduguri. This is to enable the military to strategies and build the morals of the soldiers in the battlefield. To this extent, the military being a governmental institution or structure has been able to deploy its men into various nooks and craning of the hideout of the terrorists. In fact, within the period the military were relocated, they were able to carry out a routine check on the Sambisa forest where they (military) did a total clean up. This is because before their relocation, Sambisa forest was under the control of the Boko Haram. All these achievements are linked to the functions of the military, as this is not to say that there are no cases of bombings or terrorism activities but to a very large extent, the military has performed reasonably fair in the war against Boko Haram. This is part of their function that has yielded positive results.

## CONCLUSION

In Nigeria, the military has fought and won several wars/crisis ranging from the Biafra war of July 6, 1967 – January 15, 1970, Maitatsine crisis of 1980-1985, and Niger Delta resource based insurgency, but the war against the Boko Haram insurgency has proven to be one of the security challenges to confront the country since independence in 1960. The Nigerian military forces, trained in conventional warfare, have found it difficult to effectively counter the activities of the insurgency, as the Boko Haram group has used a range of Tactics, Techniques, Procedures and Strategies (TTPS) to confront and confound the Nigerian security forces.

While it is sensible to assess the performance of the military in the war against Boko Haram, the group's decay is additionally the result of numerous forms at the regional and local level. The military under the Buhari administration was significant in planning a territorial and universal reaction to Boko Haram, persuading the US to offer arms to Nigeria once more and working closely with territorial states presently included within the battle. Also, the relocation of the Command and Control Centre of the Military to Maiduguri and the combined approach involving Nigeria's military and her neighbours (Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) added impulse and recharged vigour to operation Zaman Lafiya, which is pointed at bringing the guerrilla to an end in North Eastern Nigeria.

Thus, it is on record that the military has achieved a remarkable success, but the series of recent bombings that we experience in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States are some reasons that the military needs to cover more ground in terms of sustaining peace and security in those areas.

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