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Security Agencies Rivalries And Insecurity In Plateau State: What Are The Drivers?

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ABSTRACT

The paper examined security agencies rivalry and insecurity in Plateau State. The paper adopted the theoretical constructs of the paper adopted the theoretical constructs of the Group conflict theory. To interrogate this problematique, it adopted the survey research design. A sample size of four hundred was collected through the application of the Taro Yamene formula. Questionnaires were designed and administered to the respondents in the cluster area in tandem with the sample size of the study. Nine interview questions were constructed and carried out among ten interviewees cutting across the identified category of respondents. Notably, three hundred and eighty four questionnaires were retrieved out of four hundred sample size, representing ninety six percent retrieval rate; and with a multi-stage sampling technique, distributed to the cluster area of the three Senatorial Districts of Plateau State as the study area. The data were analyzed using simple percentages/frequency distributions, mean score on a four-point Likert scale of descending order and Chi-square statistical tool focused on the null hypothesis to determine the relationship between the study variables. Findings from the study reveal amongst others that security agencies rivalry is a major challenge to security in Plateau State. Going forward, the study recommended amongst others the urgent and dire need for security agencies collaboration to cohesively confront the common enemies and unfriendly forces of peace in Plateau State.

Keywords: Drivers, Inter-agencies, Rinsecurity, Plateau State, Rivalry

INTRODUCTION

Plateau State, also known as the home of peace and tourism, was once considered the melting pot of Nigeria, drawing people from all corners of the globe (Peters, 2023). This reputation stemmed from its abundant mineral resources, environmental appeal, strategic location, and the warm hospitality of its inhabitants. However, from 1999 to the present day, Plateau State has undergone a significant transformation, from being home of peace to that of conflicts and wars. The persistent and enduring conflicts in the State have become a major impediment to the genuine pursuit of peace and harmony.

The insecurity prevailing in this once haven of tranquility threatens to overshadow all conventional solutions, including peace committees, investigative commissions, joint security task forces, and more. Regrettably, the government's handling of the conflicts has been inadequate in creating the necessary conditions for peace to flourish. While some factors can be attributed to external state and non-state entities, a particularly concerning issue is the internal strife among security agencies, which are tasked with upholding peace and security in the State and beyond. Inter-agency rivalries have become a

pervasive and alarming aspect of the operational structures of security agencies, especially in Plateau State. Their fundamental roles as guardians and impartial arbiters of security matters have been compromised due to rampant inter-agency disputes. It is no exaggeration to state that inter-agency friction poses a significant threat to internal security and national unity, with Plateau State being no exception.

Solomon and Ajasa (2021) argued that the prolonged discord among security agencies poses a significant threat to national security. They emphasized the necessity of cohesive practical involvements and collaborative operations among the security entities to effectively address the intricate challenges of low-intensity violent conflicts and prevent their recurrence. The underlying rivalry is not rooted in patriotism or dedication to the nation, but rather in the competition for resources and the desire for individual agency success. Consequently, this lack of effective intelligence sharing, cooperation, and idea exchange hampers the opportunity for operational assessment and the formulation of successful strategies to address security service failures within the security agencies in Plateau State.

In Nigeria, the dearth of inter-agency collaboration within the security institutions stands as a prominent obstacle to efficient conflict resolution and security management. The failure to work harmoniously together results in heightened insecurity concerns and a dwindling trust in the security system's capacity to safeguard the lives and assets of the civilian population nationwide, especially in areas plagued by terrorism. Odum (2019) underscored that the ongoing rivalry among security forces has tragically led to the unnecessary loss of troops during joint operations due to what is often deemed as accidental discharge.

The symbiotic interface and harmony required among the various security agencies to combat the multifaceted challenge of insecurity in Plateau State are noticeably lacking. There exists a diversion of focus and attention from addressing the common adversary towards magnifying mutual distrust, suspicion, unhealthy competition, blurred role boundaries, intolerance, and ego stroking among other issues. This situation is further exacerbated by the internal dynamics within a specific security agency. The reactive behaviors within a particular security agency pave the way for what transpires in their interactions with one another, consequently influencing their overall performance. Furthermore, the malevolent practice of prioritizing state-centric policies over people-centric approaches, known as securitization, poses a significant obstacle to the pursuit of peace in Plateau. From 2013 to 2023, as discussed in this paper, the theme of rivalry among security agencies, intertwined with their concerning relationship with insecurity, has remained stagnant in Plateau State. This forms the core focus of this analysis. Consequently, there is a pressing necessity to unveil the underlying dynamics surrounding this thematic context in order to pave a path forward.

Based on the fore-going, the paper thus poses this questions:

What are the drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State?

As a follow - up to the questions above, a hypothesis was posited, thus:

H₀₁: There is no significant correlation between insecurity drivers and protracted insecurity in Plateau State.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Group Conflict Theory which has its origin from France was propounded by three early researchers which include Joseph Louise Lagrange (1777); Hiels Henrik Abel (1799); and Evariste Galsois (1846). The theory is concerned with the study of symmetric in nature. The group conflict theory presents human beings as fundamentally group-involved beings. The theory holds that groups are formed in human communities or settings based on shared or common values/interests. However, the Group Conflict Theory was further expanded by Arthur F. Bentley in 1908 who argues that the society, the nation and the government are all made up of group of men, each group cutting across many others. Thus, this theory conceptualizes power as diffused among many interest groups which are competing against each other for power.

Mbah (2014), observed that, “the underlying assumption of group theory is that there is competition and struggle for domination between or among groups.” Groups are seen to be generally more competitive

and aggressive than individuals. In this case, the most influential group will be decided by the level of competition and the quality of competing groups; it is likening to life in the jungle where survival is only available for the fit-test. Commenting on the above, Izueke (2014), observed that “whenever an issue boarder on society, people, government, etc, groups are always discernable.” Odoma (2014), appraised that group consciousness develops through experience gained from participating in regular group activities. Consequently, emotional attachment to group activities rather than rational thinking develops. However, inter group conflict begins when their interests and purposes tend to overlap and or encroach on one another, hence, their relationship becomes competitive. This competitive conflict engenders member’s emotional attachment and loyalty to their various groups.

Using the group conflict theory as a framework of analysis is justifiable as the study focuses on groups that are competing or struggling for dominion between or among groups. As with the study under examination, conflict begins when the interest and purposes of the group members tend to overlap on their relationship to competitiveness. There is emotional attachment and loyalty to the various groups by members hinged on group consciousness. Unfortunately, instead of engaging in a healthy and symbiotic competition towards achieving a common goal, security agencies engage in bitter rivalries among themselves, thus, their gallant effort at managing insecurity in Plateau State as other part of the nation is grossly undermined. The rivalry among these security agencies whose duties are fundamentally similar but operationally different are informed among others by either overlapping of responsibilities or the encroachment on the roles of one another thereby exacerbating a competitive posture among themselves. The security agencies engage in advancing and protection of their various interest groups without minding whose ox is gored. Collaboration and camaraderie are sacrificed on the altar of primordial group interest. This accounts for carry over grief which pitched them against one another as opposed to combating the common enemies and unfriendly forces on the Plateau.

Likewise, the excessive and aggressive poise to protect and defend group interest by the various ethnic, religious and socio-cultural sect, is known to have her tolls on the insecurity settings in Plateau State., typically, the farmers/herders, indigenes/settlers, Christians/Muslims, Berom/Hausas/Fulani debacles. Group conflicts often have their causes rooted in the perception of one group about the other. With this stereotype, there is a misperception of the others, which is often at the heart of inter-group conflict. This is a common phenomenon that characterizes the subject matter of the study, thus, justifying the application of the group conflict theory in the study.

CONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY AGENCIES RIVALRIES

The concept of security agencies rivalry has gained a common place in the social science discipline with quantum experts and contributors viewing the discourse from varying perspectival considerations not anchoring on any generally accepted definition.

Gosnell (2019), in his California Law Review article, notes that “agencies have institutional cultures, political allies, or policy priorities that lead to clashes.” However, they asserted that “conflict can be most constructive when they bring differing expertise, information bases, constituencies, and values into policy decisions”. Tade (2021), reiterates that “Inter agency rivalry was mainly being caused by the overlapping or conflicting mandates of these agencies”. This synchronized with the position of Kamensky (2018), that “there are many overlapping areas of interest, laws and jurisdictions. For example, in Washington DC, there are many Federal Law enforcement entities, Capitol Hill police, Federal Protective Service, FBI, Park Service and probably a few more”. So, who have jurisdictional primary over any particular incident can be confusing. Similarly, Odum (2019), states that here in Nigeria, “There are several agencies created for the purpose of law enforcement”.

Irwin and Kenneth (1998), cited in Samuel (2022), buttresses that “conflicts between groups, nations and individuals occur when the aspirations and goals of the parties have divergent interests regarding a particular issue”.

KAS (2021), observes that inter agency friction is a major threat to internal security and national cohesion. This explains the wasted budgets, the duplication of functions, mutual mistrust and the

encroachment on each other's legal and operational space by competing agencies. That "agency rivalry exposes security agencies to public ridicule and a possible loss of public confidence in the ability of these agencies to perform their statutory functions." Tade (2021), maintains that poor inter-agency collaboration among Nigeria's security institutions is one of the major factors militating against effective conflict resolution and security management in Nigeria. The consequences of not working effectively together culminate in increasing fear of insecurity and diminished trust in the capabilities of the security system to protect the lives and properties of civilian population across Nigeria in general and terror zones in particular.

In his assessment, Shehu-Huss (2017), notes that, "the lack of trust, respect, coordination and collaboration of security agencies is rooted in our nation's history". Obi (2017), remarks that "the repeated violent clashes among the security professionals have consistently alienated them from the public". In the same vein, Solomon and Ajasa (2021) hold that officers and men of different security organizations have been locked up in multi dimensional inter agency rivalry and bloody clashes. They further held that the sustained, disunity among security agencies constitute a grievous threat to national security. Maibasira (2022), highlights that "unhealthy inter agency rivalry is a major factor limiting the capacity of Nigeria's armed forces to effectively contain the insecurity bedeviling the nation" Usman (2021), opines that inter agency friction constitutes a major threat to informal security and national cohesion. It accounts for budgetary waste, duplication of functions, mutual suspicion and encroachment on each other's legal operational space by competing agencies.

Odoma (2014), identifies institutional challenges as they affect inter-agency collaboration in the areas of inadequate internal training on the inevitability of collaborative action within agencies; poor leadership and corrupt practices, indiscipline; institutional policy summersaults and poor feedback mechanism on experience during collaborative action within and between agencies; administrative lapses; and a manifest unwillingness to adapt to changes and innovations.

Cipriano (2018), maintains that conflict between groups or individuals stem from the withdrawal of legitimacy. People are sufficiently aroused for conflict when channels for expressing grievances do not exist and when their desire for membership into higher ranks are thwarted at this point, withdrawal of legitimacy occurs. Systemic failures considered as one of the potent causes of conflict especially within and between the army and the police forces in Nigeria. One of the strongest motivations in any place of work is proper care or the welfare of the workers. To fail to take good care of workers well-being is to create a sense of alienation in them. The personnel of the Nigerian Army have suffered for a long time from neglect especially by their leaders who at sundry times were accused of misappropriating funds meant for their troops. This leads to grumbles and unrests among the lower echelon of the army. Unfortunately, this awful narrative is a common denominator in all the security agencies and other ancillary bodies.

In the same light, envy has been identified to aggravate fracas between the Nigeria Army and the Nigeria police *vis-a-vis* among security agencies, which according to Odoma (2014), centers on illegal opportunities available to the police to extort money and or receive bribe from the citizenry in the course of their duties. Due to this reason, any slight provocation or error from the police sparks destructive conflict between the forces. The most common scenarios for these clashes include traffic police demanding vehicle particulars and driving licenses from military personnel and those of sister agencies or seeking to search their private vehicles.

Adetoye and Osunrayi (2020), decried instances when security agencies are involve in violent conflict in the full glare of the civil populace as noticed in Nigeria of late, it spell doom for national security. This means inter agency synergy would have failed, while public confidence leading to civil police cooperation becomes difficult. Odoma (2014) observed that inter agency clash was first reported in Nigeria in 1977 in Port Harcourt between personnel of Nigeria police force and Nigeria Army. The problem of inter-agency conflict has not only become repeated in several parts of Nigeria but has over the years involved virtually all the security agencies and para-military organizations in Nigeria.

Ayo and Anaede (2018), highlighted on factors militating against inter agency cooperation in Nigeria to include; feeling of superiority, envy and jealousy, gross indiscipline, poor remuneration, pecuniary interest, unhealthy rank comparison, lack of inter agency communication, weak leadership, duplication of function and poor delineation of roles, lack of effective disciplinary measures and poor condition of service, conflict among and within agencies can provide substantial political, social welfare, and legitimacy benefits. Agencies have different institutional cultures, political allies or policy priorities that lead to clashes and that conflict can be most constructive when they bring differing expertise, information bases, constituencies, and values into policy decisions.

Cipriano (2018), buttresses that not all conflict is negative; positive conflict can improve problem solving, clarify issues, increase participant involvement and commitment and result in a better decision or outcome. The key is managing conflict to bring about these positive effects. While stressing on “how conflict in the work place can be beneficial”, Gosnell (2019), asserted that it produces new ideas, solves continuous problems, provides an opportunity for people and them to expand their skills and fosters creativity. When opposing ideas are explored, a breakthrough of thinking can occur. However, when the state is not able to deal with a political crisis, for instance, a number of actors, through a multi stakeholders approach, pool their efforts in an attempt to stabilize the situation. On the international scene, Brigand (2020), posited that in Argentina in 2001 civil society, the UNDP and the Catholic Church practically pushed the political actors to stop the instability and rebuild the capacity of the state to deal with the issue, driving the crisis. He maintained that the triggers for civil society involvement are the crisis itself and the inability of the state to respond. Political crisis generate a pull towards the idea of multi stakeholder process.

Odetoro (2007), stresses that in Quagaduogou, Burkina Faso, there was a violent clash between the nation’s army and the police on the 20th day of December, 2006. The clash led to the death of five security officers (3 soldiers and 2 policemen). It was reported that some civilians suffered various degrees of injury from stray bullet, also jail break with about 600 inmates escaped. The Pakistan Press International - PPI (2003), reported that the army/police clash in Lahore on 30th October, 2003, was caused by matters relating to the use of tinted glass. It generated tension among the forces and the civilian populace. Brigand (2020), observes that on 1stOctober, 2002, another army/police clash occurred in Jakarta-Indonesia. The clash that claimed at least lives of four police officers occurred among about 100 Indonesian soldiers and their police counterparts. The clash was reportedly caused by the arrest of a soldier by the local police for drug offence. As a result, a group of soldiers attacked a police post with matchets, rifles, and grenades, killing about four police officers. In a related submission, Samuel (2022), reveals that the Afghan army/police clash which lasted for four day was said to have started from a minor argument between personnel of the forces. The clash left in its trail two military commanders, eight police officers and nine civilians dead while unquantifiable amount of properties were destroyed with several civilians left with various degrees of injury.

Another common instance of inter-agency rivalry is exemplified by the notorious September 11 attacks, widely referred to as 9/11, during which four coordinated suicide terrorist assaults were executed by the militant Islamist network Al-Qaeda against the United States on Tuesday, September 11, 2001. Olaleye (2023) noted that deficiencies in communication between the FBI and CIA contributed to the United States government's vulnerability to the 9/11 terrorist attack in 2001. It was reported that the Egyptian intelligence had alerted the CIA specifically, yet a mishandling of the information between the two agencies has left a dark stain on US history. Ogbujah (2023) argued that "as individuals coexisting in the same society with diverse interests, preferences, values, knowledge, styles, perspectives, and backgrounds, we must consistently intersect each other's realms of interests and values." This underscores the inevitability of rivalry despite conflicts. While conflicts among security agencies, groups, and individuals are inevitable, it is the perspective, approach, and management that require paramount attention; in their absence, they escalate into violence, causing more harm than good.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodologically, the paper adopted the survey research design through examination of a specific phenomenon by utilizing both primary and secondary data. The population adopted for the paper is the Plateau State 2006 National Population census figure projected at 4,717,300 by 2022; as derivable from the statistical research jointly conducted by the National Population Commission (NPC) of Nigeria and National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Multi-stage sampling technique was adopted due to the complex nature of the study population. While Taro Yamane formula was used in determining the sample size of 400 used for the target population

Table 1: Population of Selected LGAs in the Senatorial Districts of Plateau State

S/N	Senatorial Districts/LGAs	Population
1.	Plateau North Senatorial District:	
	a) BarkinLadi LGA	179,805
	b) Riyom ”	131,778
	c) Jos North ”	437,237
2.	Plateau Central Senatorial District:	
	a) Bokkos LGA	179,550
	b) Panskhin ”	190,114
	c) Mangu ”	300,520
3.	Plateau South Senatorial District:	
	a) Langtang North LGA	142,316
	b) Qua’an Pan ”	197,276
	c) Shedam ”	205,119
	Total	1,963,715

Source: Extracted from the National Population Commission, (2006) Table constructed by the authors
 The instruments for the data collection include the questionnaire and interview. The questionnaire as the major instrument for data collection were categorized into two sections, Section A, focused on obtaining the socio-demographic information of the respondents, while Sections B through F focused on the specific issues of the research. The interview instrument was used among the respondents as a medium of gathering data from the various clusters of the study population.

Table 2: Distribution of Questionnaire

S/N	Category of Respondents	No of Questionnaires	Percentage (%)
1.	Nigeria Police Force (NPF)	70	17.5
2.	Nigerian Army (NA)	60	15
3.	Nigerian Airforce (NAF)	50	12.5
4.	Nigerian Navy (NN)	30	7.5
5.	Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)	50	12.5
6.	Department of State Services (DSS)	40	10
7.	Scholars	40	10
8.	The press	30	7.5
9.	NGOs/CSOs	30	7.5
	Total	400	100

Source: Field Survey, 2024

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

The variables were analysed using their mean point values which were responded on a 4-point scale quantified as Strongly Agree (SA) = 4, Agree (A) = 3, Disagree (D) = 2 and Strongly Disagree (SD) = 1; where a higher value indicates a more positive response than a lower value. The scale mean being “2.5”

while the criterion mean cut off point is above “2.5” as the stance of setting a higher criterion for acceptance of any item statement. (Onyekwere, Douglas and Azuibuike, 2020). Hence a criterion validity was applied which compare the scale to an established research or outcome.

Research questions: *What are the drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State?*

Table 3: Computation of percentage responses on the drivers of Protracted insecurity in Plateau State.

S/N	Questionnaire	SA	A	D	SD	N	Sum	Mean	Result
		4	3	2	1				
		F(%)	F(%)	F(%)	F(%)				
7.	Drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State do exist.	240 (62%)	134 (35%)	6 (2%)	4 (1%)	384	1,378	3.6	Accepted
8.	Drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State:								
i.	Security Agencies Rivalry	261 (68%)	96 (25%)	17 (4%)	10 (3%)	384	1,376	3.6	Accepted
ii.	Indigenes/Settlers feud	145 (38%)	210 (55%)	20 (5%)	9 (2%)	384	1,259	3.3	Accepted
iii.	Political Bickering	165 (43%)	190 (49%)	18 (5%)	11 (3%)	384	1,277	3.3	Accepted
iv.	Religious Bigotry	130 (34%)	240 (62%)	10 (3%)	4 (1%)	384	1,277	3.3	Accepted
v.	Poverty	120 (31%)	210 (55%)	23 (6%)	31 (8%)	384	1,187	3.1	Accepted
vi.	Farmers/Herders Rivalry	232 (60%)	130 (34%)	10 (3%)	12 (3%)	384	1,350	3.5	Accepted
vii.	Conflict Merchants	160 (42%)	210 (55%)	6 (1%)	8 (2%)	384	1,290	3.6	Accepted
viii.	Illiteracy/Ignorance	150 (39%)	190 (50%)	20 (5%)	24 (6%)	384	1,234	3.2	Accepted
ix.	Boko Haram insurgency	130 (34%)	170 (44%)	34 (9%)	50 (13%)	384	1,148	3.0	Accepted
x.	Poor governance	150 (39%)	182 (48%)	13 (3%)	39 (10%)	384	1,211	3.2	Accepted
xi.	Weak Judiciary	166 (43%)	174 (45%)	29 (8%)	15 (4%)	384	1,211	3.3	Accepted
xii.	Porous Border	182 (47%)	130 (34%)	34 (9%)	38 (10%)	384	1,194	3.1	Accepted
xiii.	Youth Restiveness	160 (41%)	168 (44%)	30 (8%)	26 (7%)	384	1,230	3.2	Accepted
xiv.	Climate change	125 (33%)	170 (44%)	40 (10%)	49 (13%)	384	1,139	3.0	Accepted
xv.	Corruption	165 (43%)	200 (52%)	12 (3%)	7 (2%)	384	1,291	3.4	Accepted

Source: Field Survey, 2024

In table 3, the study sought to identify the drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State. On whether Drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State do exist, 240 respondents representing 62% strongly agree, 134 representing 35% agree, 6 representing 2% disagree while 4 representing 1% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.6.

On the drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State:

- i. **Security agencies rivalry:** 261 respondents representing 68% strongly agree, 96 representing 25% agree, 17 representing 4% disagree, while 10 representing 3% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.3.
- ii. **Indigenes/Settlers Feud:** 145 respondents representing 38% strongly agree, 210 representing 55% agree, 20 representing 5% disagree while 9 representing 2% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.3.
- iii. **Political bickering:** 165 respondents representing 43% strongly agree, 190 representing 49% agree, 18 representing 5% disagree while 11 representing 3% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.3
- iv. **Religious Bigotry:** 130 respondents representing 34% strongly agree, 240 representing 62% agree, 10 representing 3% disagree while 4 representing 1% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.3.
- v. **Poverty:** 120 respondents representing 31% strongly agree, 210 representing 55% agree, 23 representing 6% disagree while 31 representing 8% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.1.
- vi. **Farmers/Herders Rivalry:** 232 respondents representing 60% strongly agree, 130 representing 34% agree, 10 representing 3% disagree while 12 representing 3% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.5.
- vii. **Conflict Merchants:** 160 respondents representing 42% strongly agree, 210 representing 55% agree, 6 representing 1% disagree, while 8 representing 2% strongly disagree.
- viii. **Illiteracy/Ignorance:** 150 respondents representing 39% strongly agree, 190 representing 50% agree, 20 representing 5% disagree, while 24 representing 6% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.2.
- ix. **Boko Haram Insurgency:** 130 respondents representing 34% strongly agree, 170 representing 44% agree, 34 representing 9% disagree while 50 representing 13% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.0.
- x. **Poor Governance:** 150 respondents representing 39% strongly agree, 182 representing 48% agree, 13 representing 3% disagree while 39 representing 10% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.2.
- xi. **Weak Judiciary:** 166 respondents representing 43% strongly agree, 174 representing 45% agree, 29 representing 8% disagree while 15 representing 4% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.3.
- xii. **Porous Border:** 182 respondents representing 47% strongly agree, 130 representing 34% agree, 34 representing 9% disagree, while 38 representing 10% strongly disagree.
- xiii. **Youth Restiveness:** 160 respondents representing 41% strongly agree, 168 representing 44% agree 30 representing 8% disagree while 26 representing 7% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.2.
- xiv. **Climate change:** 125 respondents representing 33% strongly agree, 170 representing 44% agree, 40 representing 10% disagree, while 49 representing 13% strongly disagree. The mean was 3.0.
- xv. **Corruption:** 165 respondents representing 43% strongly agree, 200 representing 52% agree, 12 representing 3% disagree, while 7 representing 2% strongly disagree. The mean 3.4.

Test of Hypotheses

The test statistics used is the Chi-square (χ^2). According to Baridam (2008), the Chi-square test can be used for one, two or more variables to determine how well an observed set of data fits an expected set.

Chi-square is given as:

$$X^2 = \frac{\sum (fo - fe)^2}{fe}$$

Where X^2 = chi-square

fo = observed frequency

fe = expected frequency

The expected frequency (fe) is given as:

$$\frac{\text{column total} \times \text{row total}}{\text{grand total}}$$

The degree of freedom (df) = (r - 1) (c - 1)

Where r = number of rows

c = number of columns

The level of significance is 0.05 as contained in the Table value.

Decision Rule: Reject the Null Hypothesis (Ho) if the computed value of Chi-square (χ^2) is greater than the Table value.

Test of Hypothesis

Ho1: There is no significant correlation between insecurity drivers and protracted insecurity in Plateau State.

Frequency of response on questionnaires in Table 3 was employed on the chi-square thus:

Table 4: Frequency of Response on Hypothesis One

Frequency of Response					
S/N of Questionnaire	SA	A	D	SD	Total
7	240	134	6	4	384
8(i)	261	96	17	10	384
(ii)	145	210	20	9	384
(iii)	165	190	18	11	384
(iv)	130	240	10	4	384
(v)	120	210	23	31	384
(vi)	232	130	10	12	384
(vii)	160	210	6	8	384
(viii)	150	190	20	24	384
(ix)	130	170	34	50	384
(x)	150	182	13	39	384
(xi)	166	174	29	15	384
(xii)	182	130	34	38	384
(xiii)	160	168	30	26	384
(xiv)	125	170	40	49	384
(xv)	165	200	12	7	384
Total	2681	2804	322	337	6144

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Table 4 above shows the frequency of response on questionnaire items in Table 3 which focuses on the drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State.

Table 5: Contingency Table on Test of Hypothesis One

Cells	Strongly Agree		Agree		Disagree		Strongly Disagree		Total
	Fo	Fe	Fo	Fe	Fo	Fe	Fo	Fe	
1	240	168	134	175	6	20	4	21	384
2	261	168	96	175	17	20	10	21	384
3	145	168	210	175	20	20	9	21	384
4	165	168	190	175	18	20	11	21	384
5	130	168	240	175	10	20	4	21	384
6	120	168	210	175	23	20	31	21	394
7	232	168	130	175	10	20	12	21	384
8	160	168	210	175	6	20	8	21	384
9	150	168	190	175	20	20	24	21	384
10	130	168	170	175	34	20	50	21	384
11	150	168	182	175	13	20	39	21	384
12	166	168	174	175	29	20	15	21	384
13	182	168	130	175	34	20	38	21	384
14	160	168	168	175	30	20	26	21	384
15	125	168	170	175	40	20	49	21	384
16	165	168	200	175	12	20	7	21	384
Total	2681		2804		322		337		6144

Source: Field Survey, 2024.

Table 5 above is a contingency table on test of hypothesis one with focus on questionnaire response in Table 3.

Table 6: Computation of Chi-square on Test of Hypothesis One

Cells	Respond	fo	fe	fo-fe	(fo-fe) ²	(fo-fe) ² /fe
1	SA	240	168	72	5184	30.9
	A	134	175	-41	1681	9.6
	D	6	20	-14	196	9.8
	SD	4	21	-17	289	13.8
2	SA	261	168	93	8649	51.5
	A	96	175	-79	6241	35.7
	D	17	20	-3	9	0.5
	SD	10	21	-11	121	5.8
3	SA	145	168	-23	529	3.1
	A	210	175	35	1225	7
	D	20	20	0	0	0
	SD	9	21	-12	144	6.9
4	SA	165	168	-3	9	0.05
	A	190	175	15	225	1.3
	D	18	20	-2	4	0.2
	SD	11	21	-10	100	4.8
5	SA	130	168	-28	784	4.7
	A	24	175	-151	22801	130.3
	D	10	20	-10	100	5
	SD	4	21	-17	289	13.8
6	SA	120	168	-48	2304	13.7
	A	210	175	35	1225	7
	D	23	20	3	9	0.5
	SD	31	21	10	100	4.8
7	SA	232	168	64	4096	24.4
	A	130	175	-45	2025	11.6
	D	10	20	-10	100	5
	SD	12	21	-9	81	3.9
8	SA	160	168	-8	64	0.4
	A	210	175	35	1225	7
	D	6	20	-14	196	9.8
	SD	8	21	-13	160	8
9	SA	150	168	-18	324	1.9
	A	190	175	15	225	1.3
	D	20	20	0	0	0
	SD	24	21	3	9	0.4
10	SA	130	168	-38	1444	8.6
	A	170	175	-5	25	0.1
	D	34	20	14	196	9.8
	SD	50	21	29	841	40.1
11	SA	150	168	-18	324	1.9
	A	182	175	7	49	0.3
	D	13	20	-7	49	2.5
	SD	39	21	18	324	15.4
12	SA	166	168	-2	4	0.02
	A	174	175	-1	1	0
	D	29	20	9	81	4.05
	SD	15	21	-6	36	1.7
13	SA	182	168	14	196	1.2
	A	130	175	-45	2025	11.6
	D	34	20	14	196	9.8
	SD	38	21	17	289	13.8
14	SA	160	168	-8	64	0.4
	A	168	175	-7	49	0.3
	D	30	20	10	100	5
	SD	26	21	5	25	1.2
15	SA	125	168	-43	1840	11
	A	170	175	-5	25	0.1

	D	40	20	20	400	20
	SD	49	21	28	784	37.3
	SA	165	168	-3	9	0.1
16	A	200	175	25	625	3.6
	D	12	20	-8	64	3.2
	SD	7	21	-14	196	9.3
	X²					646.82

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Degree of freedom (df) = (r-1) (c-1)
 (16 -1) (4 -1) =15x3
 = 45

The next largest df value in the Table value is used as an approximation, hence df is 50. The Table value at 0.05 level of significance and 50 degree of freedom is 67.505.

Decision: The computed value of x2 (646.82) is greater than the Table value (67.505) at 0.05 level of significance and 45 degree of freedom. This falls in the areas of rejection and indicates that there is a significant correlation between insecurity drivers and protracted insecurity in Plateau State. Thus, the Null Hypothesis One (Ho1) is rejected.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The result of data analysis in Table 3 revealed that 374 respondents representing 97% agreed that drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State do exist, 10 respondents representing 3% disagree while the mean was 3.6 accepted.

On drivers of protracted insecurity in Plateau State: 357 respondents representing 93% agreed to security agencies rivalry, 27 respondents representing 7% disagree, while the mean was 3.6 accepted. On indigenes/settlers feud as driver of protracted insecurity in Plateau State, 355 respondents representing 93% agree, 29 respondents representing 7% disagreed while the mean was 3.3 accepted. On political bickering, 355 respondents representing 8% disagree while the mean was 3.3 accepted.

On religious bigotry, 370 respondents representing 96% agreed, 14 respondents representing 4% disagree while the mean was 3.3 accepted. On poverty, 330 respondents representing 86% agree, 54 respondents representing 14% disagree while the mean was 3.1 accepted.

On farmers/herders rivalry, 362 respondents representing 94% agree, 22 respondents representing 6% disagree while the mean was 3.5 accepted. On conflict merchants, 370 respondents representing 97% agree, 14 respondents representing 3% disagree while the mean was 3.6 accepted.

On illiteracy/ignorance, 340 respondents representing 89% agree, 44 respondents representing 11% disagree while the mean was 3.2 accepted. On Boko Haram insurgency, 300 respondents representing 78% agree, 84 respondents representing 22% disagree while the mean was 3.0 accepted. On poor governance, 332 respondents representing 87% agree, 52 respondents representing 13% disagree while the mean was 3.2 accepted.

Furthermore, on weak Judiciary, 340 respondents representing 88% agree, 44 respondents representing 12% disagree while the mean was 3.3 accepted. On porous border, 312 respondents representing 81% agree, 72 respondents representing 19% disagree, while the mean was 3.1 accepted.

On youth restiveness, 328 respondents representing 85% agree, 56 respondents representing 15% disagree while the mean was 3.2 accepted. On climate change, 295 respondents representing 77% agree, 89 respondents representing 23% disagree while the mean was 3.0 accepted. On corruption, 365 respondents representing 95% agree, 19 respondents representing 5% disagree while the mean was 3.4 accepted.

The result from the data analysis corresponds with the calculation of Table 5 which shows chi-square (X²) value calculated at 646.82 while the Table value of 67.505 at significance level of 5% (0.05) and 50 degree of freedom falls in the rejection areas. The null hypothesis one (Ho1) is rejected as the computed value of chi-square (646.82) is greater than the Table value (67.505). This implies that there is a

significant correlation between insecurity drivers and protracted insecurity in Plateau State as revealed by majority of the respondents.

In line with the above assertion, it was further maintained in the interview with the interviewee below:

Without mincing words, security agencies rivalry is at the forefront of insecurity drivers in Plateau State. Nobody is fighting insecurity in Plateau State as the insecurity fighters (security agencies) are busy fighting themselves. Likewise, poor governance, as government is not living up to her responsibility there is rising poverty, unemployment, crime rates, historical and carry over grievances, farmers/herders excesses and religious fanaticism. All these among others combined to put Plateau State on the front burner of hostility (M. Lawal, personal communication, December 8, 2023).

Hence, the findings from the paper revealed that the drivers of the protracted insecurity in Plateau State amongst others are security agencies rivalry, indigenes/settlers feud, political bickering, religious bigotry, poverty, farmers/herders rivalry, conflict merchants, illiteracy/ ignorance, Boko Haram insurgency, poor governance, weak judiciary, porous border, youth restiveness, climate change and corruption.

As revealed from the findings, security agencies rivalry poses to be a potent driver of protracted insecurity on the Plateau. Security agencies lack the necessary collaboration and synergy to align and stamp out insecurity in Plateau State. They shifted focus and engaged in unwarranted pursuit of supremacy battle and wistful target. Energy and resources meant to confront the enemies are wasted on settling scores among themselves. As the saying goes: “While the elephants fight, the grasses suffer” as their hostility persists, insecurity continues to have its field day in Plateau State. In fact, worst still, they engaged in the unthinkable tactics of sabotaging the efforts of one another by playing the blame and ridiculing one another’s weaknesses. It is therefore an understatement that security agencies abandon their primary duty to wash their dirty linen in the public glare, thereby selling off their public public-trust and confidence. The people they are meant to protect and secure never align with them because the security they cannot provide for themselves, they cannot provide for others, as one cannot give what one does not have. As long as security agencies constitutionally empowered to maintain peace and order, secure and protect lives and properties, are busy fighting themselves and are left with little or no strength to confront the common enemies, insecurity will effortlessly thrives in Plateau State. More worrisome is their double standard which further balkanize the fragile peace on the Plateau.

This collaborates the submission of Mohammed (2021), that what is making the conflict more complex to manage is due to ethnics and religious dimension it has taken, people have chosen to align with their own (tribe), even when they are the architects of the recurrent incident that have caused the loss of lives of countless people and rendered millions homeless. The claim and counter claim to the ownership of the Plateau has remains a contentious issue of concern in the area. The Berom/Anaguta/Afizere (BAA), believed to be the traditional owners of the Plateau are labeled as “indigenes”, while the Hausa/Fulani are termed “settlers”. The BAA are on the defence of their heritage from encroachment by the Hausa/Fulani. This finding is in agreement the assertion of Isa-Odidi (2014), that the real underlying cause of the conflict in Plateau State is the use of “indigene” status in determining access to limited unemployment opportunities and resources such as land. Consequently, non indigenes are termed “settlers” or visitors who do not have claim to land equal to that of “indigenes”.

Finding in the research question was equally in line with the observation of Sani (2023), who pointed out that since 1999 every Government has its share of experience with the killings in Plateau State. After the corpses are buried, money is donated to widows, orphans and the displaced victims, then, they wait for the next round of massacre.

George, Egobueze and Nwaoburu (2021), observed that democracy and its towering tenets are being abysmally raped pejoratively desecrated on the altar of intra-party politics; party politics is barren of the necessary ingredients of democratic ethos. Consequently, these party hijackers and bandits pride themselves in wielding the political imprimatur of god-fatherism and goddess-motherism to deaden the collective voice of their stooges, inter-alia party members. Political representation is selfishly handpicked

by party warlords against party guidelines and the whims and caprices of the generality of party members. The consequences have been retarded developmental growth and crisis attraction.

The pervasive self centeredness and double standard of the political class midwived political bickering which exacerbates conflict in the Plateau. With the subversion of the will of the citizenry and the awful manipulation of the psyche of the youth, youth restiveness is attracted. Succinctly put, politics is meant to position and advance the aspiration of the citizenry; however, the findings of the Study revealed to the contrary in Plateau State. Politics in Plateau State is brazenly played along ethnic and religious divides. Elections and appointments into sensitive positions are politically manipulated along ethno-religious indexes thereby escalating and prolonging insecurity in Plateau State. In harmony with the above findings, Krause (2011), maintained that many political rivals have instrumentalized the ethnic and religious diversity of Jos to manipulate and mobilize support. Each outbreak of violence worsens suspicion and renders communal reconciliation more difficult, deepening and polarizing the cycle of conflict. Justice and accountability have also been lacking. The highly connected individuals and politicians involved in generating tensions are equally effective in using their influence to protect perpetrators of violence.

The above assertion was further collaborated by Tunde (2016), that the foundation of the lingering crisis and inter communal violence in Plateau State was well laid in 1994, when Aminu Amato of Hausa/Fulani descent was appointed by the then military administrator, Col. Mohamed, as Chairman of Jos North LGA, during the General Sani Abacha military junta. The stiff and bitter hostility between the Hausa/Fulani and the BAA sparked off from then. In fact, the subversive widening political exclusion has contributed in no small measure to the insecurity Armageddon in Plateau State. As revealed in the findings of the Study, poor governance is one of the drivers of insecurity in Plateau State. Section 14, Sub-section (2b) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria held that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.” Unfortunately, the government as a State has failed in her responsibility which accounts for the persistent outbreak of insecurity in Plateau State. There is no demonstrable sincerity by the various levels of government to stop the carnage in Plateau State. Even when Commissions and Committees of enquiry are set up to address insecurity issues, if the recommendations escaped tele-guidance and manipulation, they are never implemented. Particularly, at the rural areas, government never provides the minimum basic amenities and enabling environment for peace to thrive.

The zero sum and militarist driven approach may fail to address the historical, political and socio-economic roots of conflict on the Plateau. Hence, Gwaza (2022), observed that the conception of security in post World War II era was anchored on the protection and preservation of the State’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and the regime in power. This trend however changed at end of cold war to the protection and preservation of the national, who now become the primary unit of analysis and who is meant to live under socio-economic and political conditions that seek to guarantee the twin values of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

Poor governance stirs up other societal maladies such as youth restiveness, endemic corruption and poverty which exacerbate insecurity. Government has failed in its responsibility to provide the enabling environment for job opportunities and skills to the teeming youths. The youths are frustrated and angered by the gross neglect, as their potentials, strength and agility are not maximized, they become a ready tool for insecurity and conflagration on the Plateau. Furthermore, the rot and decadence of corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of the Nigeria State such that the much touted dividend of democracy and good governance has remains an elusive fantasy. Public funds and resources meant for the welfare of the citizenry and the development of the State are mindlessly looted by insatiable State actors and their cohorts. Unfortunately, with no identifiable means of livelihood among the generality of the populace in the midst of a devastating economic environment, sustained hunger, lack and want become their bed fellows. Poverty begets frustration, frustration fronts anger, while anger fertilizes conflict and insecurity.

Conflict merchant is another grew area among the drivers of insecurity in Plateau State as revealed in the Study. There are individuals and organizations whose stock-in-trade tends towards milking from the

insecurity trend in Plateau State. They remain in their nefarious business as long as insecurity persists. They are involved in the supply of weapons and ammunitions to perpetuate insecurity. Conflict merchants have a network of local, national and international collaborators. This finding is in agreement with the position of Amagba (2018), that Nigeria and indeed Plateau State has become a huge market for domestic, regional and international arm dealers and syndicate, a major destination of SMLWs flows and center of illicit trafficking with an increase arm bearing groups and a rise in armed conflict and violent criminality, major conflict points in the State have extended.

The result from our findings revealed that the incessant spate of insecurity in Plateau State had accounted for the proliferation of SMLWs across the length and breadth of the State notably the rural areas. The warring factions of the insecurity keep stock piling brandishing unlawful possession of SMLMs with flagrant disregard to the law enforcement agencies. At the cessation of each conflict era, weapons are not surrendered to the security agencies.

Similarly, from our findings, government's poor compensation and rehabilitation of victims of insecurity outbreak weaponizes and escalates retaliatory tendencies across the land of Plateau State. With this in place, reprisal attack is evoked at the instance of every crisis. Agreeing with the findings of this Study on the lapses of the government, Sanusi (2023), observes that "since 1999, every government has its share of experience with the killings in Plateau State. After the corpses are buried, money is donated to the widows, orphans and the displaced victims, then, they wait for the next round of massacre".

Religious sentiment and fanaticism are identified at the basement of the conflagration rocking the Plateau. Muslim faith is a common place among the Hausa/Fulani while the indigenous BAA is known to be predominantly Christians. Any spark of conflict between them is often overblown by religiosity. This is collaborated by the view of Adzande (2022), that: "religious intolerance and the abuse of religion in the interest of a group of people who consider themselves as custodians of religious values and faith have been a major cause of the crisis especially in the north."

Furthermore, the findings of the Study showed that farmers/herders rivalry is one of the major drivers of insecurity in Plateau State. Here, farmers are majorly indigenes known for ownership of farmland; while herders are the settlers that migrated with their herds in search for green grasses as the vegetative disposition of the area makes it a beehive of activities for both. Increase in population and threat from climate change leave pressure on the available piece of land and water for farming and grazing. Worst still, trespass and disruption of farm produce by herders make fracas inevitable in Plateau State.

In a similar submission to buttress the findings of the Study, Shobaya (2023), held that there are four types of herdsmen, the ones that are settled at home and have their livestock around their homes and create no problem whatsoever, another one, herdsmen moving from the northern part of this country to the central and southern parts of Nigeria, creating problems along the routes. The other one is trans-human herdsmen coming from West Africa down to northern Nigeria, down to the middle belt and down to the southern part of Nigeria creating a lot of problems down the roads. The fourth ones are herdsmen who have settled among certain ethnic nationalities in Nigeria; because in yester-years, it was a symbiotic relationship between herdsmen and farmers. Herdsmen provide manures for the farmers and the farmers provide grazing areas for the herdsmen.

During insecurity insurgency, farms and cattle are destroyed while farmers and herders do not have free access to cultivation. This leads to shortage of food production which causes hunger and malnutrition. Our results in the Study is in line with the position of Umeagbalasi (2023), that banditry has stopped farming activities and most farmers have left their farming communities and returned to safe places for fear of attacks by bandits.

In a related development, the result of the findings revealed a strong link between illiteracy/ignorance and the insecurity wave in Plateau State. With a scanty knowledge on circumstances surrounding the insecurity trend, parties in conflict are blindfolded into taking side. This is mostly identified amongst rural dwellers where there is pervasive illiteracy/ignorance. When people are poorly informed, they easily act on sentiments and emotions. The awareness level of insecurity dynamics *vis-à-vis* its devastating

consequences is in short supply thereby people are easily swayed into joining the bandwagon. In some cases, questions are neither asked nor discussion engaged before joining forces on provocative issues.

Further findings from the paper revealed that there is a strong nexus between weak judiciary and insecurity management in Plateau State. Insecurity in Plateau State is emboldened because conflict merchants and entrepreneurs of insecurity are treated with kid gloves through circumvented and diluted proceedings. The Law never takes its course on them and their cronies. Judiciary is no more the hope of the common man, the weak and the vulnerable. It has assumed the posture of a toothless bull dog that only bark without biting. With brazen and awful selective justice, reports of various commissions of enquiry in Plateau State are neither challenged nor implemented. Thus, insecurity in Plateau State feeds fat on justice miscarriages. Beneficiaries of conflict and insecurity will stop at nothing to ensure that the hostility continues. Fifth columnists and crises entrepreneur do not only feed fat on our commonwealth but also on the lingering conflict rocking the Plateau. In further validation of the above, Zulum (2022), asserted that the Director, Defence Media Officer, Maj. Gen. Bernard Onyeuko revealed that troops had on July 24, 2022 apprehended three gun runners during a clearance operation at Shimakar village in Shedam Local Government Area of Plateau State. The suspects are Mr. Julius Simon (alias Bagga), aged 37, Mr. Wolta Zambai aged 45, and Mr. Iliya Peter (alias Duuboo) aged 27.

Again, as revealed in the findings, porous borders strongly connected to the incessant wave of insecurity in Plateau State. The porous nature of the Nigeria's border, including Plateau accounts for cross border crimes and related insecurity articles. The herders especially the Hausa/Fulani herdsmen from neighboring countries have free entry and exist through the poorly secured borders. Threat from within Africa, especially the Sahel, as third and outer cycle of security threat is evident from the involvement of foreigner in the Plateau conflicts. Adinoyi (2023), held that the security threats in neighboring countries, especially countries in the Sahel region tend to push people out in search of means of survival to places like Plateau State. The mass movement of foreigners into Plateau State has strained the resources capacity of the State and unduly interferes with the economy of the State and ultimately the desire to meet the human security needs of the people.

The findings of the Study revealed that climate change drives insecurity in Plateau State. The devastating effect of the climate change which has assumes a global dimension has resulted to displacement of both man and animals. Aquatic life is affected, so also is forestation. Desertification in the Sahel region is becoming more pronounced by the day. The quest for man to seek for survival out of the gloomy situation has resulted to migration and pressure on the green grasses and water on the Plateau which is blessed with vegetative environment. These herders are forced to move in search of green grasses and water for their cattle, during which they encroach on the farmland of the farmers which brews confrontation and conflict. In fact, the sustained bombardment by the Nigeria Security Forces on the Boko Haram insurgency in the north east of Nigeria has led to their fleeing to neighboring States, Plateau State inclusive. The multiple bomb blasts on Christmas Eve 24th December 2010 in Jos South, Barkin Ladi and Riyom was traceable to suspected activities of Boko Haram.

Mutfwang (2023), asserted that there was no Plateau community fighting another community. It was insurgency and reign of terrorism. Hitherto, the narrative has been farmers/herders clashes, but I stand here as the Governor of Plateau State telling you and the World that that is not the narrative. Every Plateau person is a lover of peace, and what has confronted us is a terror from the outside.

Chime (2023), succinctly maintained that on Sunday 24th December 2023, gunmen stormed Ndam, Ngyong, Murfet, Makunday, Tamiso, Chiang, Tahore, Gawarba, Dares, Meyeng, Darwat and Batura Kampani villages in the Barkin Ladi, Mangu and Bokkos areas of the State burning houses and shooting residents. On Tuesday 26th December, 2023, the chairman of community peace observers in the Bokkos LGA, Mallai, in an interview with the Punch, said "over 150 people were killed in the attacks in Bokkos town alone, more than 10, 000 people are taking refuge in churches, mosques, schools and private residences.

The 2023 Christmas massacre of over 160 Plateau Christians was traceable to the handiwork of Fulani Jihadists and conspiratorial security. The Board chairman of the Human Right Group International

Society for Human Rights and Rule of Law, Emeka Umeagbalasi maintained that “the Group observed with deepest shock, dismay and sadness that security forces in Nigeria including the Armed Forces, the Nigeria Police and the DSS and Government protected Fulani jihadists have continued unchecked to slaughter, abduct and disappear thousands of defenseless Nigerians (mostly defenseless Christians and non-Muslims others) on the ground of their faith and ethnicity”.

In an interview on Channels Television, Thursday 26 December, 2023 the Plateau State Governor, Caleb Mutfwang narrated thus:

This has indeed been a gory Christmas for us. We have had to celebrate with a heavy heart, that when people had finished preparing for Christmas celebration, unprovoked attacks were unleashed on several of our communities. In Mangu LGA alone we buried at least 15 people. So far, this morning in Bokkos LGA, we were counting not less than 100 corpses. As I am talking to you today (Tuesday, 26 December, 2023), in Riyom LGA and Barkin Ladi LGA, schools have been occupied by these terrorists for almost a number of years now. We have not less than 64 communities that have been taken over by the terrorists. Under the last regime (President Muhammadu Buhari), the feeling among people in Plateau State particularly the victims of these terrorist attacks is that it looks as if the terrorists were given official government backing to be able to terrorize them because little or nothing was done to repel these attacks. I can tell you these schools that are being occupied, it didn't just start now, some of those schools have been occupied in the last three, four, five years. Children therefore in those schools have not been able to go to school. They have to relocate. We even have primary health care centers abandoned because of these terrorists, which means that our health care system is put in jeopardy. What do we need to do? I think this is where the President needs to come in.

Drawing from the views of some retired generals of the Nigerian military on what should be done to tackle the insecurity in six months, Agbonomon (2024), revealed that one of the reasons insecurity is not going away is because since 1999 when democracy was rebirthed no President or Commander-in-chief has given a direct, definitive order for terrorists or bandits to be decisively dealt with. What we usually get is open ended directives. No timeline to get things done and no consequences for not getting things done. What President Bola Tinubu should do as C-in-C is to give a definitive order to the Minister of Defence, the CDS, the Service Chiefs, and the Inspector General of Police, that this insecurity should end in three or four or six months. If after the time frame given, the criminals are not cleared out, the Minister, CDS and Service Chiefs should be asked to go, I bet you, you will see a change.

CONCLUSION

Rivalry as a dangerous trend among security agencies to a large extent accounts for the lingering insecurity in Plateau State. The security agencies' focus is diverted from their constitutional roles to self seeking pittance thereby weaponizing insecurity on the Plateau. The protracted insecurity in Plateau State are driven and cemented by certain segmented crucibles such as security agencies rivalry, indigenes/settlers feud, political bickering, religious bigotry, poverty, farmers/herders rivalry, conflict merchants, illiteracy/ignorance, Boko Haram insurgency, poor governance, weak judiciary, porous border, youth restiveness, climate change and corruption.

Security agencies rivalry in Nigeria is caused by notable indexes such as gross unethical conduct, superiority struggles, overlapping boundaries, lopsided reportage, poor condition of service, intra-agency injustices, weak punitive measure, Stakeholders apathy, poor communication, poor training modules, suspicion/distrust and unhealthy competition. Unparallel sour taste of insecurity is left in Plateau State in the area of loss of lives and properties, displacement, economic stagnation, socio-political instability, psychological trauma, infrastructural damage, poverty, proliferation of SMLWs, food crisis and criminality/cultism/banditry among others. These multiple vampires have denied Plateau State the needed peace hitherto. Unfortunately, the various security stakeholders have not done enough to tackle the bottleneck of security agencies rivalry in Plateau State in particular and Nigeria in general. It has always been instances of inactions, lip service and double standard.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. There should be a comprehensive guidelines and standards for collaboration among the security agencies such as capacity building on inter-agency cooperation and collaboration at all levels to cement a vertical and horizontal symbiotic relationship and team spiritedness towards addressing insecurity in Plateau State. There should be re-tooling and rejigging of the security architecture towards professionalism and modern trends; non kinetic approach, hence digitalization of the security operations as well as integration of counter terrorism, counter insurgency and counter banditry operations.
2. There should be engagement with community leaders to identify potential threats to peace in Plateau State, thereby nibbing them in the bud. Hence, a more humane approach to law enforcement and winning the trust of local communities in major priority areas through community policing and applications of diversified non-kinetic and all-inclusive bottom top approach to peace building.
3. The Judiciary should be apt to its responsibilities. Judicial corruption should be discouraged. Those found culpable to the criminality and crimes in the State should be brought to book by the Courts.

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