



doi:10.5281/zenodo.14958588

# East Asian and African Developmental States Models: Lessons for Nigeria

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## ABSTRACT

The underdevelopment witnessed in some Third World nations has kept scholars, development practitioners and policy makers on their toes in search of solutions. This led to the adoption of developmental state model in certain countries which has arguably worked successfully. Premised on this, this paper interrogates the East Asian (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) and African (Mauritius, Botswana and Ethiopia) developmental states models with a view to drawing some lessons for Nigeria. It is an explanatory study which utilises secondary data to explore critical areas (political leadership, bureaucracy, and policies and programmes) of the developmental state models adopted by these countries. While acknowledging the debate on whether some of these countries especially those of Africa are truly developmental states, with a note of caution on Ethiopia's developmental state model. Consequently, the study draws some lessons for Nigeria.

**Keywords:** Developmental state model, bureaucracy, industrialization, policies, programmes.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The idea of developmental state was born out of events that occurred during the great depression, but became necessary after World War II. While these experiences were critical, dominant among them was the idea that state intervention was fundamental in addressing structural deficiencies to economic growth (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2011). Attempts at adopting historical narrative suggests that the concept of developmental state was originally proposed by Chalmers Johnson aimed at defining Japan's aggressive interventionist policies which resulted in robust industrialization and long-term economic growth (Johnson, in Jodasz; Lane & Rodrik, 2024), becoming a colloquialism that describes the development of recently industrialized Asian Tigers countries (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore) (Haggard, 1990).

The success recorded by the above developmental states especially those of East Asian nations may not be in contention, but the applicability of the models in the present developing nation states that practices democracy has been a source of serious debate among scholars since those East Asian nations were authoritarian. Arguing in this direction, Yoo (2016: 775) submits that "all the studies conducted about the developmental states in East Asia could not deny the success of these countries. Even criticisms on the developmental path is not strong, as the path is completely different from the neoliberal thinking". The difference lies on the applicability of developmental states in East Asia to developing countries". Agreeing with this submission results in the convergence by Ziya (1991) and Manuel (2010), that these models could not be easily applied in developing countries because the success of these models was achieved under authoritarian governments. On the contrary, Nyong'o (2007) contends that democracy suits

Africa, maintaining that African countries which were more democratic than others performed better than others. To be specific, countries such as Mauritius, Botswana, Kenya, Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire which upheld democratic principles through pseudo elections have done better when compared with other African countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia and Congo (Nyong'o, 2007). Jong (2002) recommends that the developing countries should selectively apply the components of the models that are suitable to their environment. Strengthening this recommendation, John (2012) asserts that the first step to take in applying these models is to consider the public opinion or else the application would be very challenging. Looking at it from a positive standpoint, ERA (2011) submits that it is currently convenient to apply the models of developmental states of East Asia in African developing countries. Ethiopian experience supports this submission as the country has been relatively considered a developmental state after implementing the East Asian developmental states models. This is illuminated by Clapham (2006) that the emergence of Ethiopia as a developmental state is to an extent attributed to the 'emulation policy' of the successive Ethiopian governments which started with the implementation of Russian model in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. Furthermore, since the year 2000, the East Asian countries development trajectories have been officially adopted by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. However, the reforms of 2018 appear to have moved towards the West, departing from the East Asian-inspired governance ideology that the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front had previously embraced. Similarly, INEF-Report and Meisenhelder (1997), Edge (1998) contend that developmental state in Africa was country-based using Botswana and Mauritius as point of reference. These countries embarked on successful developmental journey after gaining political independence in 1960s. This paper explores the developmental state models of the East Asian and African countries with a view to drawing some lessons for Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the interrogation focuses on critical factors such as political leadership, bureaucracy, and policies and programmes of these countries. The study also proceeds to examine the East Asian developmental state models while the second section of the paper is devoted to African (Botswana, Mauritius and Ethiopia) developmental state models. The next section compares the two models, while the fourth section is a discussion (drawing some lessons for Nigeria) and conclusion.

## **2. METHOD**

This is a descriptive and explanatory study which combines description with explanation using secondary data such as peer reviewed journal articles, government policy documents, newspapers and books. Botlhale (2017) argues that this method is designed to describe the emergence of a phenomenon while probing the rationale for the belief. For the descriptive aspect, the study seeks to provide detailed descriptions of emergence of developmental states in East Asia and Africa while the explanatory part of the study provides underlying reasons for the status of most of these countries as developmental states. This particular aspect addresses issues of "why" and "how".

## **3. Developmental State: Concept and Issues**

Developmental states are known for their capacity in allocating and investing resources in critical areas (such as education) which drive industrialization. Strong bureaucratic institutions and a form of committed collaborative governance involving political leadership, public organizations, civil society organizations and private sector are also systems existing in developmental states (Woo-Cumings 1999). Conceptually, developmental states are viewed as states with concentration of enormous powers at the centre aimed at influencing, meeting and encouraging the realization of developmental objectives through initiating and entrenching conditions and the trajectory of economic growth; pursuing it directly, or adopting the both methods. It can also be defined as a state that is resolute in shaping the direction of economic growth through direct intervention in the developmental process, rather than leaving the allocation of economic resources to be driven by market forces. A developmental state is one in which the government is actively and practically involved in both micro and macroeconomic activities aimed at achieving economic growth (Leftwich; Johnson; and Onis in Mokaloba & Motshegwa, 2020).

It is a concept that can be understood while acknowledging two major components (ideological and structural). The ideological attributes illuminate the developmental objectives of the government as a legitimate authority to advance sustainable economic growth. On the other hand, a developmental state must put in place a bureaucratic system (state structure nexus) which ensures the achievement of development. Synthesizing the components therefore suggests that a developmental state is the one which is not only driven by developmental principles but also establishes bureaucratic organizations to attain economic growth. It is a representation of government stepping back from market regulation but with the aim of necessarily intervening to correct flaws in the system (Johnson; Mkandawire; Nem Singh & Ovadia in Kelecha, 2022).

The above discussion signposts a state with a robust and functioning bureaucratic structure deliberately intervening in a developmental process with well-planned policies and programmes designed and implemented to achieve developmental objectives. The relevance of private sector is practically acknowledged by not only putting the needed infrastructures in place but also carefully relaxing certain economic regulations when necessary. A developmental state is not only strongly driven by developmental ideology but also has a vibrant administrative system that effectively carries out state activities that would warrant development. Arguably, leaders of developmental states must not be self-seeking, parochial, sentimental and corrupt as these attributes are antithetical to the processes that drive development. Therefore, our contention is that the seemingly unsuccessful attempt by some Third World countries especially in Africa to attain the status of developmental states is stymied by the above negative factors.

#### **4. East Asian Developmental (States) Models**

A significant number of East Asian countries have successfully deployed measures resulting in transformation from agrarian to industrial economies, and post industrial economies have experienced rapid industrialization leading to uncommon economic development and significant improvement in citizens' quality of life. These nations have implemented effective initiatives and reduced the level of poverty in their countries. Specifically, their economies have transformed from being heavily dependent on the primary sector in the 1960s to manufacturing and service contributing largely to GDP (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2008). It could be further argued that they adopted state-directed, export-focused, and industrialization-driven growth pathways to drive economic growth in the 1960s (Hyunjeong, 2018). The next section discusses the following factors: political leadership; bureaucracy; and policies and programme responsible for the development existing in these countries.

##### **4.1 The Political Leadership**

East Asia comprises China, Japan, North Korea, Taiwan and South Korea (Timothy, 2014). This section intends to interrogate the political system of East Asian with a view to ascertaining the countries' political leadership trajectories leading to their present developmental status. There is a contention about Japan being an undemocratic nation precisely from the early period of Meiji Restoration (1868–1912) to the end of World War II, noting an interregnum of limited democracy witnessed under Taisho (1912–1926), the country had more experiences of undemocratic and illiberal governments. Increasingly, the country's pre-World War II foreign policy was strongly expansionary and militaristic, suggesting the use of industrial power to conquer its neighbouring East Asian countries (Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria) and subsequently, confronting Western imperial dominance across the Asia. However, Japan is argued to be currently peaceful, stable and progressive democratic state. Naturally, Japan's industrial power before the war also signalled a dramatic shift in the country's economy. The nation was termed a quasi-feudal system for centuries, both before and throughout the Tokugawa era on the basis of an economically independent and distinctly nonindustrial framework.

At the beginning of nineteenth century, the country continued to be economically developed and slightly higher than Western Europe in Middle Ages. Meanwhile, a large number of its citizens were impoverished peasants without freedom, residing mostly in rural settlements. The primary source of wealth and the cornerstone of the economy was rice production, which continued with the use of

antiquated techniques with minimal alteration at some points. However, "a feverish process of modernization began from the era of Meiji, creating the framework for an economy that was heavily commercialized and industrialized which would finally stand as a competitor to the most developed Western economies of the era. Contrary to popular belief, the modernization process was more gradual and spatially constrained. Nevertheless, Japan had accomplished a significant economic shift by the early twentieth century (Lockwood, in Timothy, 2014).

After decades of colonial rule, South Korea and Taiwan found themselves engulfed with fierce and protracted post-war conflict between the US and the former Soviet Union, or more generally, between the communist world and the West. To Korea, this conflict led to the country's painful split into the pro-Soviet Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the pro-US Republic of Korea (South Korea). Although a democratic government was established in 1948 as a result of South Korea's ties with the United States, the nation continued to face numerous significant internal and external challenges such as weak economy, catastrophic war against North Korea, fierce internal ideological rivalry, and extreme political factionalism. These challenges led to a departure from democracy and towards authoritarianism and tyranny. The fraudulent 1960 presidential election led to popular protests resulting in the overthrow of Syngman Rhee's First Republic in South Korea and the establishment of military-authoritarian rule under Park Chung Hee in 1961 (Rowley, Oh & Jang, 2019).

The Cold War conflict also had immediate and long-term implications in Taiwan, where the island's "native" people were exposed to yet another invasion, this time, however, authorised and legitimised by foreign forces. Before the World War II ended, United Kingdom, United States and Republic of China had an agreement (the Cairo Declaration of 1943) premised on mainland China, led by the anti-communist Chiang Kai-shek. In the agreement, the parties held that Taiwan, or the island of Formosa as it was then known, would be "given back" to mainland China either at the end of the war or after Mao Zedong's Chinese communists were defeated by Chiang's nationalist troops. However, Chiang's forces were defeated by the Chinese communists in 1949.

In the 1950s, both countries were poor, demonstrated in their categorization as quintessential third world countries with per capita incomes comparable to or below most other countries in the world, including those of Asia, Latin America, and Africa. For instance, in 1950, the per capita GDP of South Korea and Taiwan was far lower than that of Morocco, Jamaica, and Honduras, and less than half that of Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Furthermore, the per capita GDPs of the Philippines, Ghana, and Sri Lanka were all larger than those of Taiwan or South Korea, while Egypt's was around the same. However, with the exception of Mexico, Taiwan and South Korea had almost exceeded all of the aforementioned nations in less than a generation (Timothy, 2014).

It can be inferred that these East Asian nations with the exception of Hong Kong passed through national reconstruction and rebirth, while most of the nations deployed instruments of strong leadership through one-party system as witnessed in Singapore and Taiwan or dictatorship as the case in South Korea to achieve political sovereignty or eliminate anti-government forces. However, from the late 1980s, majority of the states have undergone democratic revolutions, either by lifting martial law in Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, Hong Kong, or by ending authoritarian rule in South Korea. It is instructive to note that this change of political direction was encouraged by a large number of civil activities by democracy activists such as non-governmental organizations, labour unions and social advocacy groups (Hyunjeong, 2018).

#### **4.2 The Bureaucracy**

There is a consensus among scholars on the importance of strong bureaucracy in achieving the objectives of developmental state and this accounts for vibrant bureaucratic structure witnessed in East Asian developmental states. For instance, in Japan, the bureaucracy constitutes a vibrant and strong social class of administrators with consistent and cogent interests. The appointment process for the small and elite state bureaucracy is determined by national examinations and is independent of election outcomes. Appointments are made from the top ranks of the best law schools, in addition to a sense of corporate commitment fostered through enduring merit driven system of recruitment and reward for bureaucrats. Therefore, the civil servants are under obligation to pursue collective objectives rather than personal

interests which the market presents, allowing the state to act independently of some social forces. The informal networks within and outside the developmental state further improve the coherence of the bureaucracy. Internal networks are relationships existing between course-mates at the prestigious universities where civil servants are employed from, and these relationships are mostly based on stringent selection process. The high regard for competence as the prerequisite for admission into the networks makes committed members to be highly appreciative. Beyond this, the bureaucratic web is deeply ingrained in Japanese society as industrial policy depends upon the interaction existing between the industrialists and ministries. Ministry of International Trade and Industry alumni play a significant role in strengthening the bonds between bureaucracy and private sector since they often hold important positions in corporations, industry groups, and quasi-public organizations. Thus, rather than increasing state capture, connection works to promote state competence given a sufficiently coherent and cohesive state machinery. The Taiwan bureaucracy illuminates an administrative system that is not totally the same with that of Japan, but drives the legitimacy of the state in addition to its emphasis on meritorious recruitment of officers strengthened by ties with other institutions.

In the East Asian developmental states, “the bureaucracy drafts virtually all laws, ordinances, orders, regulations, and licenses that govern society. It also has extra-legal powers of ‘administrative guidance’ and is comparatively unrestrained in any way...by the judicial system”. The bureaucracy was responsible for initiating industrial policy as well as mechanism for implementing it (Charlotte in Strauss, 2020). Johnson in Woo-Cummings (1999) argues that a successful developmental state is the one that has a shift in thinking from producer-oriented and high-growth economy to consumer-oriented which could diminish the state’s relevance. Accordingly, bureaucratic organizations and businesses interact on public-private basis which has been developed and reformed to adapt to the ever-changing circumstances. A well-functioning bureaucracy supported effective policymaking. Governments are able to select the most qualified people in the most of East Asian nations because government service confers status. Various East Asian governments were able to organize themselves well, frequently utilizing the idea of core economic ministries, after beginning with a highly skilled and driven cadre of bureaucrats (Leipziger & Thomas in Wade, 2018).

Beyond this, there is a significant level of autonomy given to the bureaucratic organizations in the states which enables them operate not just relatively independent but also most importantly innovative. The 1961 Singapore Economic Development Board has operational independence as it was not influenced by the political class. The Board is made up of very competent bureaucrats and technocrats who have considerable independence in economic policy formulation and implementation aimed at meeting developmental objectives which include but not limited to attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). In the same vein, Japanese bureaucracy though with relatively lesser budget has skilled bureaucrats and resources are allocated carefully. This goes to suggest that competent public administrators who have sound knowledge of bureaucratic organizations, hence can make sound administrative decisions. Strikingly and currently, there is very little government interference in the Japanese automobile industry, underscoring the independence and competence of the bureaucrats in some sectors (Magaziner in Christine, 2024).

#### **4.3 The Policies and Programmes**

The East Asian developmental states selectively formulate policies (industrial) aimed at encouraging, protecting and investing in specific sectors rather than non-interference method. For instance, Japanese government executed strategic industrial initiatives aimed at encouraging the development of automobile industry. To be precise, the government implemented policy measures on subsidies, financial loans and trade barriers to encourage certain local companies such as Nissan and Toyota thereby making the environment unfavourable for foreign competitors such as General Motors and Ford (Magaziner in Christine, 2024). Furthermore, the government enacted legislation limiting the repatriation of earnings from foreign firms’ manufacturing automobile in the country, thereby promoting reinvestment in the local economy through research and development, technological transfer and domestic job opportunities.

Furthermore, it enacted legislation restricting the repatriation of earnings from foreign automakers in Japan, promoting investing in the home economy through research and development, technological transfer, or local jobs (Tamaki, 2014). Additionally, the government retained employees from competitively troubled firms such as chemical fertilizers, shipbuilding and textiles so as to give them other responsibilities, in line with the government policies of handling the reduction of these firms while redeploying workers to more productive industries in high-tech and knowledge-intensive areas (Onis, 1991). Similarly, Malaysia and Taiwan created industrial parks for high-tech sectors in order to reduce entry barriers and enable businesses to benefit from some of the diffused externalities connected to these sectors. The governments in a deliberate and isolated manner supported certain firms with subsidies and cheap credit (Jong, 2002). The governments of East Asian countries did not only resist xenophobic opposition to repatriation of funds but equally incentivized capital flows by ensuring stable political atmosphere, vibrant macroeconomic and labour markets management with competent employees. In many instances, the states made clear arrangements to guarantee that these inflows would be accompanied by a transfer of expertise/skills and technological resources.

Foreign investment raised the level at which the economy expanded, minimizing the challenges associated with restrictions on the availability of local entrepreneurship, capital and technological competence. East Asian nations put in place several export oriented policy measures aimed at promoting industrial development amidst significant divergences in endowment factors and early conditions of the economy. In the context of traditional concept of economic take off, export growth in East Asia nations propelled industrialization take off in the countries (Yoo, 2016). These states share similar institutional characteristics which include authoritarianism, state-directed, export-focused and industrialization driven by economic growth, dependence on foreign investment and international support together with mutual dependence in the area of trade (Boelhouwer & van der Heijden 1992; Bekebrede & Mayer, 2006).

Education sector was not left unattended to as the education systems in the countries experienced significant expansion amidst state formation (Masaki, 2006). One of the outstanding attributes of educational systems in these countries was the keen interest in skill formation (ERA, 2011). The importance of vibrant human capital in the formation of a developmental state was highly recognised, leading to upskilling, especially in South Korea and Taiwan. Japan took the same direction in 1960s prompted by pressure groups for the provision of effective human capital through education (Masaki, 2000). To be specific, first priority was given to primary education, subsequently secondary and higher education (Moris in Yoo, 2016). The proliferation of education in rural communities provided an opportunity for the children of farmers to be equipped with human capital development skills needed for active participation in non-farming sector of the economy. These skills enabled the people especially the female youths who became engaged in companies and started shuttling between home and the workplace. The special interest in primary and vocational education provided a strong foundation for the migration of rural manpower from agriculture and several engagements in semi-rural and urban areas (Yoo, 2016). Additionally, there was emphasis on moral instructions and values education aimed at advancing national identity and social cohesion (Masaki, 2006).

However, the above narratives did not suggest that these nations are infallible in policies and programmes, but countries whose political authorities are determined to initiating pro-people policies aimed at taking the nations higher developmentally. To be sure, policies could be reviewed, adjusted or even completely reversed when there are stronger arguments against them. This submission is strengthened by the opinion of Leipziger & Thomas (1994) that policies in East Asian nations (successful industrialized nations) were constantly reviewed and scrutinized to the extent that policies had been reversed on account of ineffectiveness and incompatibility with macroeconomic fundamentals, underscoring the influence of performance indicators on policy makers.

## **5. African Developmental States Models**

This section is devoted to interrogating the developmental state models adopted in Africa which have been argued to be successful, namely Mauritius, Botswana and Ethiopia. These countries started

developmental efforts after their political independence in 1960s by avoiding the danger of overbearing influence of state on economic activities (Meyns & Musamba, 2010). Some African countries especially Botswana (considered a developmental state driven by democratic principles) by these scholars: (Leftwich 2000; Mkandawire 2001; Künzler 2004; and Lockwood, 2006). Samatar (1999); Shumuye (2015); and Desta (2019) while acknowledging the significant similarities between these African countries developmental models and those of East Asian nations unanimously argue that the developmental models were deeply rooted, as we shall observe in the following sections.

### **5.1 The Political Leadership**

Mauritius gained political independence in 1968 after being uniquely colonized by Dutch, France and Britain in 1638-1710, 1715-1810 and 1810-1968 respectively. French colonial government created sugar estates with the use of slave labour imported from other African countries. This underscores the prosperity of Mauritius to the extent that Britain and France were competing for it during Napoleonic wars (Kiiza, 2006). After being colonized by Britain from France, many establishments belonging to France were not relocated; French language was still in use more than English language. More significantly, the descendants of French colonists, known as Franco-Mauritians, continued to play a significant role in the economy. Despite constituting only 2% of the population, they are the quintessential sugar oligarchy when compared to Indo-Mauritians (68%), Creoles (27%), and Sino-Mauritians (3%) (Meisenhelder in Temesgen, 2022).

Upon attainment of independence in 1968, the country's early conditions were appalling, with the impediments revealed in the office report of the Professor J.E. 1961 Meade Royal Commission. There were no oil or mineral resources and it had small local market with a population of about 700,000. The distance between Mauritius and the markets in Europe and America made industrialisation difficult. There were absence of technical expertise and funds for investment. Most importantly, the island's economy was based primarily on sugar (Meade Report, in Kiiza, 2006). By 1967, sugar was responsible for almost 30% of the GNP, 95% of all export revenue, and over 35% of all job opportunity (Kiiza, 2006). Naipul in Narrainen (2013) argues that the country was an agricultural colony, established by a kingdom on an empty island and designed to be a component of a larger entity, now offered political independence and set drifting. It was an imperial barracoon that had been abandoned and lacked cultural and economic autonomy. However, by 1980s, the political leadership introduced transformational structures leading to a drastic change of the narratives.

The chief was regarded as father among equals prior to colonialism in Botswana. He had the legal monopoly on military power, ordered labour for the tribe's common interests as well as his own, and controlled all natural resources, which he distributed to tribal members. He had duties to care for his subjects in addition to these privileges. The kgotla, a semi-democratic system based on open forums where tribe members who could voice their thoughts about the chief's acts, checked the chief to ensure accountability and prevent corruption (Colcough & McCarthy; Schapera; Schapera & Comaroff; Wylie in Hillbom, 2018).

Historical account on colonialism posit that Botswana had a limited colonial experience when compared with other countries both regionally and globally. Europeans were discouraged from settling in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (1885–1965), because it was regarded as a predominantly African territory (Parsons, 2006). No true development of natural resources was attempted during the first fifty years of colonialism because of lack of other potential resources and limited chances for agricultural growth. Although Hut taxes provided revenue to the colonial administrations, there was no export industry to impose taxes on, in the early decades of the Protectorate in South Africa established by the United Kingdom. The British provided political backing, basic policing and local administration, limited access to healthcare and education, and selected infrastructure development. Smallholder farmers in Batswana were essentially on subsistence bases, and the majority of their cash income came from remittances from migrant workers employed in South Africa, mostly in the mining industry (Schapera, 1980 in Hillbom, 2018).

In the 1930s, the colonial government realised that cattle component of the economy was the major comparative advantage of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in South Africa established by the United Kingdom. Tswana were agro-pastoralists, and their national herd was worth a lot of money when compared to the growth of agricultural output. Within the period, native authorities in Kgatleng District began to drill boreholes, and the colonial government also began to do so but to a lesser degree. The 1930s saw an increase in these projects (Lawry; Parsons & Crowder; Peters; Carlsson in Hillbom, 2018). In order to satisfy the health requirements of European beef importers, the colonial government made investments in veterinary fences and an abattoir in Lobatse in 1954 in addition to providing access to permanent water. The state became a monopoly controlling over all beef exports with the establishment of the slaughterhouse. Following the independence, the Ministry of Agriculture's subsidiary, the Botswana Meat Commission, or BMC, a monopoly cattle buyer and meat exporter, took control of the abattoir (Samatar & Oldfield in Hillbom, 2012). It is noteworthy that an insignificant number of Europeans ever lived in the Bechuanaland Protectorate due to their little confidence in future prosperity of agriculture or mining and few lands were given to the Europeans (Colcough & McCarthy in Hillbom, 2018). The Tswana political and economic institutional system remained robust due to this minor colonial influence, which also ensured continuity in the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial social structures (Acemoglu et al. 2003; Colcough & McCarthy in Hillbom, 2018).

Since the attainment of independence in 1966, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has uninterruptedly been in power leading to the level of development in the country. Botswana and Malaysia have made the most significant advancement in human development since 1960, and both countries have demonstrated remarkable growth and development after gaining their independence (United Nations Development Programme, 2000c). It is argued that at independence, Botswana was among the world's poorest nations, but it has had tremendous economic progress and is currently categorized by the World Bank as an Upper Middle-Income nation, with a per capita GDP of over US\$6000 (World Bank, 2020).

The political development of Ethiopia suggests that the country has passed through several forms of politico-economic orientation under different administrations. The nation had a long-standing feudal system until the collapse of the imperial administration as a result of a sudden popular political revolt (disruption) in 1974 against Haile Sellaise's government. During the imperial era, agriculture was the main driver of development because of the lengthy history of feudalism, which was marked by a conventional social structure where land was the essential means of production. This system of quasi-feudalism established the social and production ties between the two main social classes - the landlord and peasantry (Addis & Hiwet, 1975; Alemayehu, 2007). Consequently, the social relationship was exploitative since peasants were viewed as tenants and placed beneath landowners. This was particularly noticeable in the southern region of the nation (Markakis & Nega, in Markakis, 2016). During that period, the country had a highly centralised political system headed by a tyrannical monarchy which was distributing land to the people on the basis of allegiance and support to the administration. Yet, there were no opposition forces through which the voices of the people (rural and urban dwellers) could be heard. Eventually, that deplorable politico-economic situation resulted in the aforementioned popular political upheaval in 1974 carried out by peasants, teachers, drivers, students and soldiers. This may have resulted in popular political revolt which brought Emperor Haile Sellaise's government and long standing monarchical rule to an end (Endalcachew, 2018).

Consequently, the military came into power with an absolutely different political ideology (socialism or command economic system) as the country became a member state of Eastern bloc. This was the outcome of elimination of feudal system as well as land reform. However, it is arguable that the period of military intervention in politics was a lost period due to the stagnation of the country's economy (Arkebe, 2020). The average GDP growth from 1960 to 1974 was 4%, but it slowed to 2.3% during 1974–1975 and 1989–1990 (Alemayehu, 2007). This resulted from the economy's reliance on agriculture, which is susceptible to natural disasters. Additionally, among other things, the directive that farmers serve in the military, the implementation of centralised planning, and the nationalisation of land led to the stagnation of agriculture, and becoming incapable of supporting the sector. Resulting from the militaristic nature of the government



and the political unrest, the defence industry was prioritised, and capital investment directed towards defence needs, which were mostly satisfied by the Soviet Union and its allies (Arkebe, 2020) and these political problems led to the eventual toppling of the military government of Derge (Endalcachew, 2018). The current administration once more adopted western liberal philosophy after living under centrally planned command economy until the Derg regime's overthrow in 1991 (Tsehai, 2009; Muller, 2015). It was inconvenient to adhere to other politico-economic models at the time because liberal capitalism was the dominant ideology on the globe after the Cold War ended and the US-led Western bloc successfully emerged victorious. This was the point at which the ideological development of humanity came to an end (Fukuyama, in Endalcachew, 2018). Above all, the United States played a significant role in the establishment of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Therefore, the decision was to be part of the bandwagon to promote the liberal ideology in order to demonstrate its loyalty and thus benefit from the blessings of the US and some other western powers while establishing its dominance. It could be argued that the Ethiopia's adherence to western liberal philosophy aided the government in clinging to power. Facts on the ground, however, demonstrate that such adherence to western ideology did not result in economic development or Western liberal electoral democracy. The model was actually being used by the administration in conjunction with another political and economic worldview (revolutionary democracy) and its language of liberal democracy did not align with its actual activities. Therefore, the government's formal endorsement of the model was merely a symbolic action in reaction to external demands (Endalcachew, 2018).

## **5.2 The Bureaucracy**

The view that a distinguishing factor between a developmental state and other form of states is a competent and vibrant bureaucracy (without primordial sentiments) capable of implementing policies (Mkandawire, 2001) informed Botswana's bureaucratic system built gradually after gaining political independence, though with initially strong reliance on foreign experts due to inadequate indigenous manpower. Supporting this assertion, Parson in Motshegwa (2017) observes that foreign experts were not immediately disengaged after colonialism so as to assist in training the local but competent bureaucrats. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2003) argue that Botswana Democratic Party refused to be forced to indigenise the bureaucracy prior to the availability of competent indigenous public servants. Consequently, the services of expatriates were retained in addition to the use of foreign consultants and advisers. Botswana's President was quoted thus: "my Government is deeply conscious of the dangers inherent in localising the public service too quickly. Precipitate or reckless action in this field could have disastrous effects on the whole programme of services and development of the Government" (Parsons in Motshegwa, 2017: 43). This uncommon strategy led to the establishment of public bureaucracy resulting in its rapid economic growth facilitated by foreign and private investment (Hartland- Thunberg, in Nagar, 2015).

The political authorities in Botswana exercised caution in exiting experienced bureaucrats and this is mainly responsible for the country's remarkable developmental achievements (Motshegwa, 2017). "The autonomous bureaucracy, in coalition with the ruling Botswana Democratic Party succeeded through its technocratic priorities of growth and stability (at the expense of participation and equity), in establishing a solvent state, potent enough to deliver public goods (roads, schools, and, clinics among others) on a non-tribal, non-regional basis, to ensure that the minimum requirements of common supply and non-excludability are met" (Taylor, 2005: 51). However, the consensus among scholars on the performance of Botswana's bureaucracy is debatable as some have argued conversely. Notwithstanding, the Botswana's bureaucracy was sanitised and became nationalistic, championing sustainable development more than other bureaucracies in Africa. The sustenance of a vibrant, competent and relatively independent administrative system (bureaucracy) in Botswana is traceable to insulating the planning public servants against societal force, recruitment of experts and indigenous manpower development. Arguably, Botswana has benefited significantly from the autonomy driven bureaucracy, protecting policies from special-interest lobbying, however, to the detriment of democratic accountability of the bureaucratic organizations (Maundeni, in Mooketsane, Bodilenyane & Motshegwa, 2017).

The foregoing was followed by a seamless transition from a bureaucracy that was dominated by expatriate to an indigenized one, leading to an expansion of the bureaucracy for meeting national developmental objectives. As argued by Washington & Hackers in Motshegwa (2017), a broad vision for social, economic, and political development gained momentum and eventually reached its zenith with the publication of Vision 2016. This underscores the fact that Vision 2016 has been utilised to adapt and located within the framework of National Development Plans (NDPs) and reform initiatives. The state's development initiatives have been realised through National Development Plans (Bothale, 2016). The constitution of these National Development Plans gave rise to technical document, written by professionals and endorsed elective office holders to direct public policies.

With the gradual evolution of governance issues and challenges, the Public Sector's institutional frameworks gave rise to quasi-governmental organizations, government agencies, ministries, independent departments, extra-departmental organizations, the Teaching Service Management (TSM), the Department of Local Government Service Management (DLGSM), and the Ministry of Local Government. Many of these entities were established by Acts of Parliament. It is noteworthy to posit that the establishment of specialised organizations was based on need to offer services in critical sectors such as power, water, transportation and telecommunication which the central government was not strategically positioned to offer (Motshegwa, 2017). Predicated on the foregoing submission, this paper posit that the bureaucracy can be an effective tool of development as corroborated by the East Asian nations' experience.

Effective bureaucratic practice in Mauritius lends credence to its significance in the country's institutionalisation of developmental state underpinned by competent public servants in the bureaucracy inherited from the colonial government, which was pivoted on the incorporation of natives into the bureaucracy during colonialism which encouraged the firm establishment of Weberian culture in the system, in addition to the creation of Public Service Commission in 1953 (Anwar, 2023). The bureaucratic systems of developmental states found relevant anchor on Weberian ideal construct. It characteristically enables robust relationship between the society and organisations, as well as creates an avenue for continuous policy debate. Meritocracy is the major driver of recruitment process in the bureaucracy with higher academic institutions producing the candidates. These attributes enabled the public servants to be innovative while executing developmental policies, programmes and priorities. Vibrant and competent bureaucracy is sine-qua-non for regulating and implementing policies in developmental states (Evans, in Anwar, 2023). It is germane to note that Mauritius prioritises its institutions and this manifested in the establishment of Public Service Commission charged with the responsibility of recruiting bureaucrats on the basis of merit, but there are serious contentions about this.

On the contrary, scholars and writers on Public Administration have contended that Ethiopian bureaucracy does not represent a bureaucracy founded on developmental characteristics and this underscores the submission by Gebresenbet & Kamski (2019) that empirical data explains that Ethiopian's shift to a development state model has further undermined the bureaucratic autonomy and this is at variance with the ideals of a professional bureaucratic system. Although Ethiopia's bureaucracy has expanded, its autonomy is overshadowed by the authoritarian practices of the members of the political class who rationalise their interference in these public organisations as a recipe for addressing bureaucratic weaknesses using the institutional strength of Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (Oqubay, 2015). It is further stressed that the bureaucracy has never provided services to the citizens on the basis of neutrality; recruitment and promotion in the hierarchy of the bureaucracy are fundamentally driven by political loyalties (Williams & Mengistu, 2015). The country struggled to establish a robust bureaucracy despite the introduction of developmental state model by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front about three decades ago.

The above is attributed to the consideration of party loyalty at the detriment of expertise and meritocracy (Fesseha & Abtefold, 2017; Bedlu, 2019). Ethnic chauvinist principle guides the leadership, as competence and experience have been thrown to the wind in personnel recruitment and managing public sector organizations in Ethiopia. Public institutions are now meant to be headed by persons who directly

or indirectly have affiliations with those in power (Habtamu, 2017). Positions in public service are now being occupied on the basis of political loyalty, cronyism and ethnic identity at the expense of professionalism (Bedlu, 2019). Consequently, the already ineffective bureaucracy in Ethiopia is ill-equipped to carry out the necessary developmental tasks as the public organizations are manipulated by the governing elites who use the bureaucracy for patronage and expansion of their networks or punishment of their rivals. It could therefore be stated that there is a marked difference between the model adopted by Ethiopia and the East Asian countries, since the political party in power extends its control to the bureaucracy (Kelecha, 2023).

Mauritius' Public Service Commission and Botswana's Central Civil Service Commission are protected against improper political interference. The President in each of the countries can only make very limited senior appointments and civil servants are legally empowered to appeal decisions relating to personnel. Furthermore, the effective performance of the bureaucracies of these two countries is also linked to commensurate remuneration of civil servants unlike the state of affairs in some other African countries where salaries of civil servants do not reflect current economic realities. Besides, there is a political leadership with quality decisions on the structure and activities of the bureaucracies, in addition to zero tolerance for corrupt practices, leading to engagement of more bureaucrats who in turn offered the needed services for economic growth. All these stand in stark contrast with the practices in most African nations where there were political interference and poor standard of living in early periods of their political independence with subsequent demoralising remuneration (Eager Policy Brief, in Nyadera & Islam, 2022). Arguably, one of the fundamental elements of a developmental state as represented in Botswana and Mauritius unlike Ethiopia is an effective, professionalised and autonomous bureaucracy calibrated on developmental policies and programmes.

### **5.3 The Policies and Programmes**

Successive Botswana governments started from independence to highlight the significance of industrialization, implementing some programmes to encourage entrepreneurship. To be precise, the National Development Bank was set up in 1995 with the mandate of providing financial loans to every entrepreneur, but particularly those in agricultural sector. Botswana Development Corporation was established to complement the efforts of commercial banks. Meanwhile, Financial Assistance Policy is exceptional or phenomenal in the context of profile incentive measures (1982-2001), and its primary objective was to encourage and expand job-intensive and non-traditional economic activities, but the objectives of implementing these strategies were never met, due largely to their abuse by public officials (Leith, 2020). Botswana has made significant investments in infrastructure and human capital, increasing access to healthcare and education.

Robust macroeconomic policy and strong property rights have been introduced to facilitate the investment in human capital, mining and ranching. However, there is an insignificant inflation in addition to international diamond revenues and absence of expropriations, implying that growth in the country was proximately accounted for conventionally. Notwithstanding, it is argued that the country has implemented good economic policy measures, resulting in the investment in human capital and public goods, strong macroeconomic environment, prudent exploitation of its diamond resources and comparative advantage in ranching (Molokwane, 2019).

It is necessary to observe that Botswana which gained political independence in 1966 amidst scarce resources to pursue socio-economic developmental objectives due to non-exploitable natural/mineral resources has made significant developmental achievements as a result of a developmentally oriented government. The emphasis was on exploring limited resources through national development planning, resulting in the attempts towards development and increasing the living standards of the people. This was made possible by the discovery and exploration of natural resources (diamonds) at the beginning of 1970. Consequently, the country's Human Development Index grew from 0.47 to 0.683 in 1980 and 2013 respectively, graduating into the category of middle-income nations in 1992 (UNDP, 2014 and Mmegi, in Bothale, 2017). However, there are still developmental problems faced by the country such as

unemployment, poverty, HIV/AIDS and income inequality but these issues do not diminish Botswana's developmental state status.

On attainment of independence, Mauritius swiftly introduced a trade-led growth initiative driven by export promotion targeted at addressing the failure of import substitution measures and reduction in unemployment. The country also made concerted reforms initiatives and reversal of trade policies, with a view to reducing the oil crisis. Beyond this, Mauritius resisted pressure from World Bank to reduce expenditure on welfare schemes and ultimately implemented SAP's reforms through consensus (Behuria, 2022). The Mauritian economy has undergone significant structural changes, moving from a sugar-based monoculture to diversified economic activities and revenue streams, such as manufacturing, tourism, information technology, and offshore financial services (Ramtohul, 2023)

It is instructive to observe that in 1970, the country's per capita income was US\$700, and agriculture was the major driver of its economy. Presently, Mauritius, according to credible sources is a high-income country with a per capita income of US\$11,097. In addition, in 1996, Mauritius became categorised by United Nations Development Programme as a high human development country, which is the bracket for industrialised countries (Ramtohul & Eriksen, 2018). Following the failure of the import substitution plan to curb the increasing rate of unemployment, Mauritius implemented a new economic strategy centred on export-oriented industrialisation, tagged Export Processing Zone (export enclaves) which is a policy implemented by government as the main element of its objectives. Typically, an Export Processing Zone means a geographical area with privileged access to the importation of infrastructures for producing goods for free. The country has made notable achievements in attracting foreign investment, attenuating capital deficits and expediting the creation of Export Processing Zone using widespread financial assistance and incentives.

Exportation also rose significantly as a result of certain measures adopted by the government including removal of tariffs on imported goods, giving preferential treatment to manufacturers in Export Processing Zone, introducing subsidies in water and electricity, establishing flexible labour regulations, reducing minimum wages, and initiating an enabling legal framework for foreign investors (Ramdoo, 2014). The economic performance of Mauritius could be linked to its "heterodox trade policy", leading to facilitation and regulation of the economy by the government through the provision of enabling environment that encouraged competition and protection of the economy against danger coming from vulnerabilities (Rodrik, in Anwer, 2023).

Furthermore, Mauritius implemented trade initiatives similar to the East Asian examples, leading to significant gains in the export industry. The country signed the Yaounde II accord in 1970 owing to France's mediation of the unique agreement on behalf of its African colonies. The country benefited greatly from France's membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), which included unrestricted trade in European markets and preferential access to the markets. Notwithstanding their colonial history, the country's diplomats strategised to obtain a preferential trade zone to encourage exports. Similarly, Mauritius leveraged Multi-Fiber Agreement's eased regulations. In 2004, the country had a 25% decrease in employment and a 30% drop in output due to the expiration of the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) and fierce competition from low-wage textile producers in China. In its reaction, Mauritius government implemented certain economic reforms involving simplified tax, naturalization for non-citizens and capital-intensive garments aimed at competing with China. There were heavy investments in ICT, tourism, and banking sector (Anwer, 2023).

Ethiopia introduced Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization (ADLI) as a deliberate strategy for development. Ethiopia implemented a number of medium and long-term plans since 1992, with particular emphasis on policies like Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) 2005 - 2010, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Government's provision of market intervention schemes led to improved market system thereby motivating farmers toward higher productivity. Like the East Asian countries, the Ethiopian government embarked on land reforms in the late 1990s resulting in better agricultural performance. This is in addition to the launch of "Developmental Army Building" which emphasised mass mobilisation, state-led development and collective action to achieve rapid socio-

economic transformation, aligning with broader concept of Ethiopia as a developmental state where the government plays a central role in economic growth and social progress (Yoo, 2016).

Conversely, Oqubay (2018) posits that the post-2010 witnessed the development of manufacturing sector by Ethiopia People's Democratic Front as a driving force for sustainable economic growth. Consequently, industrialisation became central in the country's development efforts. This is demonstrated in the ambitious targets for manufacturing sector in second Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-11, 2015-2020) with its outstanding growth rates. The industrialisation driven policy measures include promotion of exports and imports substitution, development of infrastructure, industrial skills, and attracting foreign capital (Hauge & Irfan, in Kelecha, 2022). Industrialisation measures implemented during the previous development plan such as PASDEP encouraged macro, small, medium and large-scale industries, especially the ones that needed agricultural inputs. There were improvements in the past years. For example, there was the creation of about 1.5 million job opportunities during the implementation period of PASDEP... (EPA, in Yoo, 2016).

Despite the unusual coherence of industrial policy, there were numerous flaws in its conception and execution; inadequate implementation of reciprocal controlling measures to enhance productivity and ensuring attitudinal change across sectors. This manifested in abuse of incentives accompanied by poor control, making it difficult to realise the set objectives such as import substitution and export revenues. Meanwhile, there were lackadaisical attitudes to foreign direct investment in the country, highlighting the little efforts made to encourage foreign investors to obtain local resources or transfer technology to local industries (Oqubay, 2018). Another pointer to the poor performance of industrialization policy in Ethiopia is the significant growth in the investment of local private sector without expected outcomes of having the capacity to penetrate into the export market and manufacturing sector, which are fundamental to structural and industrialisation change (Gebregziabher, 2019).

It has been submitted that the industrial development measures implemented did not result in speedy policy outcomes in relevant sectors of the economy. Relatively, Ethiopia with manufacturing value addition at 5.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product is still a less industrialised country in sub-Saharan Africa. It is rather disturbing that, Johnson in Kelecha (2023) avers that industrialisation is not in existence in the country, positing euphemistically that the government of Ethiopia is running a successful public relations crusade, tantamount to a non-existent story.

To be sure, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian Constitution (1995) in Kelecha (2023) suggests that Ethiopia adopted measures similar to what is obtainable in East Asian nations as the government formulated sound policy aimed at developing Foreign Direct Investment, providing certain incentives for investors. In Ethiopia, it is legally provided that land property is commonly owned by the State, people and nationalities. Curiously, some scholars have argued that the policy resulted in land grabbing with its accompanied protest by the Ethiopian youths (Abbink 2011; Rahmato 2011). Additionally, loans were given to investors with considerate conditions by the government using development banks (Yoo, 2016) as Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front led government encouraged foreign investors in manufacturing sectors with financial incentives such as subsidised land leases, income tax exemption for 10 years and capital equipment (Hauge & Chang, 2019). There was a steeping growth of stock of inward Foreign Direct Investment in the past decade, but a declining level of accumulation since the beginning of global crises in 2008. The rate in 2011 was significantly higher than what was witnessed in 2000 because the inward Foreign Direct Investment stock in the year 2000 was almost \$1000 million and rose to about \$4,500 million in 2011. The government implemented policy measures that encourage export-oriented and import substitution. There are also policies on taxation system resulting in tax holidays, tax exemption and import duty free designed to promote certain sectors, particularly sectors handicapped by some challenges such as inadequate trade logistics (Mekonnen & Asmelash, 2024).

There were initiatives in the education sector which is regarded as critical engines of development in countries. To this end, the government of Ethiopia formulated education and training policy in 1994, leading to the introduction of Education Sector Development Programme in 1996/1997, presently in its fourth phase. This initiative recorded remarkable achievements, namely: significant rise in the number of

public Technical and Vocational Education Training colleges; public universities; and primary schools. A continuous increase in expenditure on education rising from about 2.3% of the GDP in 1980s to 3.6% in 1992 and 5% in 2003/2004 became beneficial to the country. In all, the government has consistently maintained 20% public expenditure on education... (MoFED, SDPRP, 2002).

### **East Asian and African Developmental States Models Compared**

The discussions on the developmental models of East Asian and African countries in the study were pivoted on political systems, bureaucracies, policies and programmes believed to be more critical in determining the extent to which these developmental states imperatives have been actualised. The trajectories of political systems of East Asian and African developmental states as deconstructed suggest that most of the countries reviewed went through colonial and authoritarian governments. Considering these similarities should not be misconstrued to mean that a developmental state must pass through colonialism and authoritarianism. However, Evans (2012) submits that a developmental state does not fundamentally imply any system of government but one that stimulates a robust partnership between the public bureaucracy and private sector. The understanding that Japan (in Asia) and Ethiopia (Africa) never experienced colonialism further strongly supports this submission, underscoring the prominent role of a strong political leadership in a developmental state rather than a political system. Furthermore, Botlhale (2017) observes that African countries were colonies of different western powers except Ethiopia and perhaps Liberia.

Tsie in Botlhale (2017) infers that Botswana is a typical example of a democratic developmental state as the country has ensured rapid economic and capitalist development while upholding democratic ideals. Japan is arguably a towering democratic nation in its region (Howe & Oh, 2015). Developmental state is evolving and has no universal meaning (Stubbs; and Evans in Botlhale, 2017). Consequently, this paper affirms that there is a nexus between the historical political developments of East Asian and African developmental states, a political system does not determine a developmental state, but must be anchored on development-minded political leadership. Certain African countries have emerged as developmental states including Mauritius which is akin to the East Asian developmental model characterised by effective bureaucracy and visionary leadership among other irreducible requirements (Shumuye, 2015).

Interrogations on bureaucracies of these states except Ethiopia explain administrative systems driven by competence and autonomy designed to vigorously pursue developmental policies and programmes. Wade; Amsden; and Huff in Ang (2017) argue that there is a competent bureaucratic system found in China, Taiwan, Korea and Singapore which was responsible for initiating and executing policies and programmes on economic development. This administrative structure had competent manpower charged with the responsibility of providing direction for the countries' development. The pedigree of and practice in these public organisations enable them to continuously employ qualified workers and also make use of policy instruments which empower them. Accordingly, the economies of the nations have grown tremendously to the extent that the developmental policies are rigorously formulated and effectively implemented.

The bureaucracy in East Asian countries does not significantly differ from the bureaucratic practice of African developmental states, precisely Mauritius and Botswana. Goldsmith in Quadri & Uche (2020) posits that Botswana and Mauritius entrenched developmental nationalism by raising vibrant and competent civil servants to buttress the above argument. Specifically, Mauritius bureaucracy is an offshoot of the elongated colonial government which laid the requisite foundation, enabling the indigenes to be bureaucratically tutored. Carroll & Carroll in Sebudubudu & Keneilwe (2016) present similar submission for Botswana while arguing that the country had been blessed with members of political class and civil servants who demonstrated personal commitment towards economic development. However, there is a consensus among scholars that Ethiopian bureaucratic system is at variance with Mauritius and Botswana's bureaucracies and raises fundamental questions in the context of developmental states (Mengistu & Vogel 2006; Oqubay 2015; Gebresenbet & Kamski, 2019; and Kelecha, 2023).

The policies and programmes in the East Asian and African countries investigated showed that the convergence among their models reflected deliberate efforts to ensure development with industrialisation being the platform. While considering peculiarities of their countries, policy interventions (loans, tax break, and tax exemption) were introduced to assist carefully selected domestic firms and also encourage foreign companies/investors by providing enabling environment. Furthermore, policies were initiated to boost job opportunities, stimulate exportation and discourage repatriation of funds. Special attention was also given to educational sector, resulting in the production of skilled and employable manpower in these countries. The next section discusses the lessons Nigeria could learn from the foregoing empirical cross-national studies and implementation strategies.

## **6. Lessons for Nigeria**

It is axiomatic from the discourse above that Nigeria can learn and adopt the following:

1. Imbibing/entrenching the virtues of visionary and development-minded political leadership: the discussion of developmental states models of East Asia and Africa in the study clearly shows the place of effective and visionary political leadership irrespective governmental system. It equally shows that states with capacity to resist pressures, both temporary and parochial political gains, will move faster towards developmental imperatives.
2. Strengthening governance institutions: Nigeria's public sector organizations are not only presently characterized by corruption but also very weak in pursuing developmental policies and programmes unlike the governance institutions in developmental states such as the East Asians, Botswana and Mauritius. Therefore, there is an urgent need to implement more transparent and accountable governance mechanisms and reforms that would significantly facilitate development and encourage massive investments in Nigeria.
3. State-led development and industrial policy: the countries studied (both East Asia and Africa) deliberately implemented state-led industrial policies, resulting in the interventions in selected sectors, encouragement of exports and protection of nascent firms until they became strong and competitive. Nigeria can take a cue from this, and adopt their pragmatic approaches to development.
4. Huge investment in education and human capital development: the yearly budgetary allocation of Nigeria to education is grossly below acceptable threshold, unlike the situation in the East Asian and African developmental states investigated. This manifests in paucity of human and material resources in educational institutions especially universities and other tertiary institutions with attendant deplorable infrastructure and harsh learning environment among others, leading to poor research outputs, unemployable graduates that cannot compete effectively in the global employment/dynamic environment. Nigeria's successive governing/bureaucratic elites require attitudinal change towards the education sector. Adequate resources reinforced by effective implementation of budgetary allocation to education are seriously canvassed.
5. Export-oriented growth and diversification: The narrative on East Asian developmental states shows deliberate interventions in selected sectors, resulting in huge earning of foreign exchange, employment creation and technological advancement. Therefore, Nigeria's successive governments must demonstrate adequate commitment to diversification and local production beyond the tokenism and cosmetic approach displayed over the years. Interventions should go beyond oil sector to include other relevant sectors such as agro-processing and textiles targeted at stabilizing the economy and increasing resilience against external shocks, and conserving foreign exchange.

## **CONCLUSION**

This paper examined the developmental models of East Asian and African nation-states and drew critical lessons for Nigeria. In an effort to achieve this objective, developmental state was conceptualised and its ingredients discussed in details. The major pillars of East Asian and African developmental states models

such as political leadership, bureaucracy, policies and programmes were interrogated, which informed the submission of this study that most of the countries except Ethiopia aligned with major metrics of a developmental state. Premised on this, some lessons were drawn for Nigeria and the effective application of these lessons could launch Nigeria into a developmental state, given the requisite political will, commitment and ecology.

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