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Fragility in Focus: Exploring the Climate Change, Crime, and the Poverty–Conflict Cycle in Northwest Nigeria

Yakubu Jafaru¹, Magaji Sule², Yahaya Ismail³ & Amina Yunusa A⁴

¹Sociology Department, University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria
Email: jafyak76@yahoo.com ORCID ID: 0009-0006-8171-6925

^{2,3,4}Department of Economics, University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria
²sule.magaji@uniabuja.edu.ng ORCID ID: 0000-0001-9583-3993

³ismail.yahaya@uniabuja.edu.ng

⁴Email: amina.yunusa@uniabuja.edu.ng

ABSTRACT

Northwest Nigeria is grappling with a challenging array of issues, where climate change, criminal activity, and poverty intertwine to perpetuate a cycle of conflict. This research investigates the relationships between environmental degradation, socio-economic hardship, and increasing insecurity within the region. By employing a mixed-methods approach that combines climate data, crime statistics, poverty metrics, and qualitative insights from impacted communities, the study demonstrates that climatic pressures—exemplified by prolonged droughts, unpredictable rainfall, and desert expansion—have disrupted traditional ways of making a living, particularly those reliant on agriculture and pastoral practices. This ecological stress heightens competition for limited resources, leading to an increase in armed robbery, cattle theft, and community violence. Subsequently, these dynamics further exacerbate poverty, drive displacement, and perpetuate a cycle of conflict. The results highlight an urgent need for climate-resilient economic strategies, enhanced community security measures, and integrated poverty reduction initiatives to dismantle the mutually reinforcing cycle of environmental degradation, economic hardship, and violence in Northwest Nigeria.

Keywords: Climate Change, Poverty–Conflict Cycle, Crime, Environmental Degradation, Northwest Nigeria. Insecurity

1. INTRODUCTION

The fragility observed in Northwest Nigeria stems from a complex interplay of environmental changes, socio-economic challenges, and a rise in criminal activities, rather than being due to isolated issues. Over the past twenty years, the region has faced escalating climatic pressures, characterised by declining rainfall, desert encroachment, and gradual land degradation (NiMet, 2023). These changes in the environment have severely impacted the agrarian economy, which sustains the livelihoods of over 80% of the population (FAO, 2021). As agricultural productivity declines and grazing lands become scarce, competition for natural resources grows, amplifying tensions between agricultural and pastoral communities.

The environmental challenges in this area are part of a broader trend of climate change effects seen throughout the Sahel. From 2000 to 2023, the variability in rainfall in Northwest Nigeria has risen significantly, with extended dry periods interrupted by flooding events (NiMet, 2023). This unpredictability disrupts sowing schedules and lowers crop yields, thus undermining food security and household income (Magaji & Musa, 2024). At the same time, the advancing Sahara Desert is reported to encroach southward by approximately 0.6 km annually in certain regions (UNCCD, 2022), further reducing the amount of arable land available for cultivation.

Although environmental degradation is a major contributing factor, socio-economic deprivation serves as a catalyst (Ismail, Bash, & Magaji, 2019). Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2023) shows that the region's poverty rate is among the highest in Nigeria, with over 70% of its population living below the national poverty threshold. Youth unemployment is particularly severe, resulting in a significant portion of the population facing limited economic opportunities and lacking opportunities for upward mobility (World Bank, 2022). A weak governmental presence in rural areas—evident in inadequate infrastructure, poor public services, and limited security—further heightens exposure to both environmental shocks and criminal activities.

In this scenario, insecurity has shifted from being occasional to becoming a deeply ingrained structural issue (Magaji, Musa, & Salisu, 2022). Incidents of armed robbery, cattle theft, and kidnapping for ransom have surged (Abdulazeez, Magaji, & Musa, 2022), with organised crime syndicates taking advantage of the governance gap and economic despair (Okoli & Ugwu, 2019). Many of these criminal activities are linked to disputes over resources, as herders and farmers compete for shrinking grazing areas and water supplies. Evidence from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED, 2023) indicates that the number of conflict incidents in Zamfara, Katsina, and Sokoto States has risen consistently over the last decade, particularly during years marked by severe drought.

This combination of climate challenges, economic instability, and insecurity fosters a continuous cycle of conflict (Olusola, Magaji, & Musa, 2025). Climatic disturbances lead to decreased agricultural output, which intensifies poverty. Economic hardship drives some individuals towards criminal organisations or incites local disputes that can escalate into violent confrontations (Adekoya, Magaji, & Ismail, 2025). Such violence results in the displacement of communities, the increase in child labour and trafficking, disruptions in production, and weakened market systems (Lamiya, Magaji, & Yakubu, 2025)—which in turn deepens poverty and makes people more vulnerable to future climate-related shocks. This cycle operates in a circular manner rather than a linear one, featuring feedback loops that perpetuate fragility unless intentional measures are taken to interrupt them.

To address this connection, a comprehensive policy approach is necessary that transcends singular climate adaptation or security strategies. Efforts must address the foundational aspects of vulnerability by integrating climate-resilient agricultural practices, promoting livelihood diversification, enhancing youth employment initiatives, and strengthening rural governance. Additionally, a conflict-sensitive approach to natural resource management is crucial for minimising competition among communities and preventing violent escalations. As highlighted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2023), resilience in fragile environments depends on the ability to simultaneously tackle the interconnected drivers, rather than addressing them separately.

This article, therefore, examines the relationship between climate change, crime, and poverty and how these factors contribute to the fragility trap in Northwest Nigeria. Utilising a Climate–Poverty–Conflict Nexus Model, it analyses how environmental stress, economic deprivation, and insecurity reinforce each other while proposing strategic avenues to disrupt this cycle through coordinated, multi-sectoral policy initiatives.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Conceptual Definition

This research relies on core concepts that are vital for understanding the linkages between climate change, poverty, and conflict, especially in vulnerable and resource-dependent communities. Each concept is articulated in a manner that aligns with the study's context.

Climate Change: Climate change is characterised as the long-term shift in temperature, rainfall patterns, and extreme weather events, primarily driven by human-caused greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2023). In Nigeria, climate change manifests through frequent droughts, erratic rainfall, heatwaves, and flooding, all of which significantly impact agricultural output, water availability, and livelihoods (Jafaru, Aliyu, & Sule, 2025). In this study, climate change includes both gradual climatic alterations (e.g., increasing temperatures) and sudden climate events (e.g., flooding or droughts) that directly influence rural subsistence economies.

Poverty: Poverty is framed as a multidimensional state of deprivation that hampers individuals' or families' ability to fulfil basic needs, such as food, shelter, healthcare, education, and participation in socio-economic activities (Sen, 1999). This study adopts a multidimensional perspective on poverty that goes beyond purely income-based measures to consider access to resources, social inclusion, and resilience against shocks (Magaji, 2002). In rural Nigeria, poverty is not only linked to economic factors but also to structural issues, including inadequate infrastructure (Magaji, 2008), weak governmental presence, and fragile local economies (Magaji, 2007).

Conflict: In the context of this research, conflict is defined as ongoing disputes or violent confrontations between groups, communities, or state and non-state actors (Zailani, Magaji, & Jafaru, 2025), often leading to loss of life, displacement, and social disruption (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). This definition covers both resource-based conflicts (such as disputes between farmers and herders over land and water) and security-related conflicts (including insurgency and banditry). Within the climate–poverty–conflict nexus, the competition for scarce resources, driven by climate change and exacerbated by poverty, serves as a primary catalyst for local tensions and conflicts.

Climate–Poverty–Conflict Nexus: The climate–poverty–conflict nexus refers to the interactive and mutually reinforcing relationship between environmental degradation, socioeconomic deprivation, and violent conflict. Climate change can exacerbate poverty by reducing agricultural output and damaging assets, thereby threatening the livelihoods of vulnerable populations (Magaji et al., 2024). Poverty consequently weakens adaptive capacity and generates grievances. Conflict, in turn, disrupts livelihoods, deepening poverty and amplifying vulnerability (Raleigh et al., 2014). This idea acknowledges that these interactions are cyclical, forming a “feedback loop” where each element exacerbates the others, as depicted in Figure 1 of this study.

Adaptive Capacity: Adaptive capacity refers to the capability of individuals, households, and communities to anticipate, respond to, and recover from climate-related shocks and stresses while preserving their long-term well-being (Adger, 2003). In this research, adaptive capacity includes both tangible resources (such as irrigation systems, savings, and technology) and intangible assets (including knowledge, networks, and institutional support) that empower communities to endure and adapt to changing environmental and socio-political circumstances.

Livelihoods: Livelihoods involve the capabilities and resources (Musa, Ismail, & Magaji, 2024) as well as the activities individuals undertake to secure a living (Chambers & Conway, 1992). In rural Nigeria, livelihoods heavily depend on climate-sensitive sectors, including agriculture, fishing, and pastoralism. This study highlights sustainable livelihoods, which can endure environmental variability and conflict pressures while also promoting social equity and environmental sustainability.

This conceptual framework views climate change as a stressor that can exacerbate poverty by depleting productive assets and reducing income. Conversely, poverty heightens vulnerability to both climate-related shocks and conflict. Conflict interrupts livelihoods, diminishes adaptive capacity, and leads to population displacement, thereby perpetuating the cycle of poverty and displacement. Grasping these definitions enables a more accurate assessment of how these factors interact in fragile rural environments.

2.3 Empirical Review

The connection between climate change, poverty, and conflict has been extensively studied in both global and African contexts, with increasing evidence from Nigeria underscoring its complexity and multidirectional causality. Empirical research suggests that environmental stressors, particularly those resulting from climate change, can exacerbate poverty and increase the likelihood of conflict. Conversely, conflict can aggravate poverty and obstruct adaptive responses to climate impacts.

A study by Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015) revealed that climate variability, especially rising temperatures and inconsistent rainfall, significantly heightened the risk of conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. They estimated that a 1°C temperature rise correlates with a 4.5% increase in the risk of civil conflict, mainly due to decreased agricultural productivity and economic strain. This finding is consistent with Hendrix and Salehyan (2012), who demonstrated a strong correlation between rainfall shortages in Africa and spikes in political violence, particularly in rural areas reliant on rain-fed agriculture.

In Nigeria, Okoli and Atelhe (2014) demonstrated that environmental degradation in the Lake Chad Basin has reduced arable land and fishing prospects, leading many young individuals to adopt transhumance and illicit economic activities, which further escalate tensions among farmers, herders, and fishing communities. This aligns with Onuoha (2008), who contended that the decline of Lake Chad is not solely an environmental concern, but also a catalyst for socio-economic marginalisation, which contributes to increased recruitment into insurgent groups.

From a poverty standpoint, Odusola (2018) discovered that climate-induced resource scarcity in Nigeria disproportionately impacts rural households, exacerbating income inequality and creating areas of extreme poverty. These economic pressures frequently lead to communal clashes over land, water, and grazing routes, particularly within Nigeria's Middle Belt region. Similarly, Abubakar (2021) found, in his analysis of Borno and Yobe States, that extended drought and flooding cycles have devastated livelihoods, resulting in displacement and escalating community vulnerability to the Boko Haram insurgency.

International research also corroborates the connection between climate, poverty, and conflict. Koubi (2019) analysed panel data spanning from 1980 to 2016 and found that economic shocks caused by climate change increase the likelihood of armed conflict; this impact is notably more substantial in fragile nations with weak institutions and high levels of poverty. In the Sahel region, Raleigh and Kniveton (2012) reported that communities experiencing prolonged climate stress exhibit increased rates of out-migration, which disrupts local economies and can instigate conflicts between incoming migrants and host populations.

Within the Nigerian context, research has pointed to adaptive strategies as a moderating influence. Eze and Iwuoha (2020) found that communities with better access to climate adaptation initiatives, such as irrigation projects and alternative income sources, experienced fewer conflicts even when faced with similar climate stress. This suggests that focused efforts on poverty alleviation and resilience-building can disrupt the negative cycle linking environmental change, deprivation, and violence.

Overall, empirical data indicate a self-reinforcing feedback loop: climate change undermines livelihoods, exacerbates poverty, and incites resource-based conflicts, which consequently diminish coping abilities and heighten vulnerability to climate-related challenges. However, the intensity of this nexus is influenced by the quality of governance, economic diversification, and the efficacy of conflict resolution processes.

Scholarship has long established that environmental pressures, especially those associated with climate change, can amplify the risks of conflict by intensifying competition over scarce resources (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012). This connection is particularly evident in arid and semi-arid regions, where economic activities are heavily reliant on climate-sensitive sectors, such as rain-fed farming and pastoralism. In Northwest Nigeria, decreasing annual rainfall, increased precipitation variability, and the gradual encroachment of desert conditions have severely limited the availability of arable land and water supplies (NiMet, 2023; UNCCD, 2022). These environmental limitations disrupt traditional seasonal migration patterns for pastoralists, hindering agricultural productivity and resulting in heightened tensions between farming and pastoral communities. Conflicts over grazing rights, water access, and crop destruction frequently escalate into violent confrontations, establishing a direct

connection between climate variability and localised conflict. Over time, such disputes can transition from isolated incidents to persistent insecurity, particularly in areas lacking effective conflict resolution mechanisms.

Poverty acts as both a driving force and a result of crime, creating a mutually reinforcing cycle that undermines community stability (Jafaru, Magaji, & Abdullahi, 2024). In vulnerable rural economies, the collapse of livelihoods leaves individuals—especially unemployed youth—more prone to recruitment into illegal activities like cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and rural banditry (Okoli & Ugwu, 2019). In Northwest Nigeria, the prospect of immediate financial gain in conditions of chronic deprivation is magnified by the limited presence of law enforcement, which diminishes the perceived risks associated with engaging in criminal activities. These crimes destabilise rural economies by creating insecurity along transport routes, hindering market activities, and causing skilled workers and traders to flee. Moreover, the targeting of agricultural assets—such as livestock theft—weakens household resilience, complicating recovery from poverty (Yakubu, Magaji, & Musa, 2024). The poverty-crime relationship is further complicated by the fact that organised criminal groups often embed themselves within local economies, using poverty as both a tool for recruitment and a means of social control.

The theory of the poverty-conflict cycle suggests that violent conflict destroys physical assets, diminishes human capital, disrupts markets, and displaces populations, thereby deepening poverty and perpetuating further conflict (Collier et al., 2003; Justino, 2012). In the context of Northwest Nigeria, this cycle is exacerbated by environmental pressures that reduce agricultural productivity and degrade pastoral resources. For instance, repeated assaults by armed factions not only force farming families to flee but also hinder their ability to return and tend to their fields, resulting in extended periods of food scarcity and diminished income. The displacement into communities already grappling with poverty further strains limited resources, increasing the likelihood of additional conflicts and perpetuating a cycle of hardship and violence. This situation is consistent with empirical findings in other vulnerable areas, where environmental challenges intersect with poverty to exacerbate the recurrence of conflict (Ide, 2020).

While the connection between climate and conflict, as well as the link between poverty and crime, are well-established in distinct strands of literature, there is a scarcity of studies that examine their combined effects in fragile regional contexts. This research builds upon the environmental security framework (Barnett & Adger, 2007) to investigate how environmental degradation, socioeconomic vulnerability, and insecurity interact to create self-reinforcing cycles of fragility in Northwest Nigeria. By merging these aspects into a cohesive analytical model—the Climate–Poverty–Conflict Nexus Model—this study aims to outline the feedback loops through which environmental stress exacerbates poverty, poverty drives crime, and crime escalates into conflict, ultimately exacerbating environmental degradation through displacement and unsustainable coping mechanisms. This integrated methodology is especially crucial for policymaking as it highlights the necessity for multi-sectoral strategies that tackle climate adaptation, poverty alleviation, and conflict prevention in tandem, rather than as separate development objectives.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

This study is anchored in a multidisciplinary theoretical framework that blends insights from environmental determinism, human security theory, relative deprivation theory, and the vicious cycle of poverty framework. Collectively, these theories elucidate the connections between climate change, poverty, crime, and conflict.

2.3.1 Environmental Determinism and Climate Stress Theory

Environmental determinism posits that environmental factors significantly influence human actions, societal structures, and economic viability. In the realm of climate change, extreme weather events, droughts, and floods reduce agricultural yields, disrupt livelihoods, and exacerbate resource scarcity. Such scarcity exacerbates poverty and has the potential to spark social unrest in vulnerable communities. The Climate Stress Theory further elucidates how environmental shocks act as triggers for migration, displacement, and competition for dwindling resources. Climate variability amplifies socio-economic vulnerabilities, rendering communities more susceptible to poverty and, in turn, instability.

2.3.2 Human Security Theory

Human Security Theory pivots the emphasis from state-centred security to the well-being of individuals. It recognises economic, environmental, personal, and community security as essential components of security. In fragile contexts, disruptions to livelihoods caused by climate issues undermine economic security, while growing poverty weakens personal security, leading to higher rates of crime and increased vulnerability to conflict. Human security is compromised when climate-induced shocks worsen economic deprivation, laying the groundwork for both criminal activities and armed disputes.

2.3.3 Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative deprivation pertains to the sense of being unfairly disadvantaged in comparison to others. When climate change has a disproportionate impact on rural and marginalised populations—diminishing income prospects while others thrive—feelings of injustice may arise. These sentiments could result in heightened criminal behaviour and violent conflict as those affected strive to address perceived inequities. Climate-induced poverty breeds frustration and resentment, which can escalate into social unrest, illegal activities, and violent confrontations.

2.3.4 Vicious Cycle of Poverty Framework

This framework illustrates how poverty perpetuates itself through interconnected processes, including restricted access to resources, minimal investment in human capital, and reduced productivity. Climate shocks intensify poverty, which in turn drives crime as a means of survival, while crime undermines economic stability, fostering conditions for ongoing conflict. This cyclical interaction reinforces the interconnected nature of climate, poverty, crime, and conflict. Breaking this cycle necessitates multi-sectoral strategies that comprehensively address climate resilience, economic empowerment, and security. By integrating these theories, the framework views climate change not merely as a separate environmental issue but as a systemic factor that drives poverty, which in turn heightens susceptibility to crime and conflict. The diagram's colour-coded sectors—Climate (blue), Poverty (green), Crime (red), and Conflict (orange)—illustrate the interconnectedness of these areas, depicting how feedback loops continue to perpetuate insecurity unless comprehensive, sustainable solutions are implemented.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Design

This research employed a mixed-methods design, combining both quantitative and qualitative strategies to gain a comprehensive understanding of the relationships among climate change, poverty, crime, and the conflict cycle in Northwest Nigeria. The choice of a mixed-methods approach is justified by the complex, multifaceted nature of fragility in the region, where mere numerical data cannot fully capture the experiences of the affected communities. The quantitative aspect involved a statistical examination of climate, socio-economic, and crime data spanning several years, enabling the identification of patterns, correlations, and trends. The qualitative aspect complemented this by gathering narratives from stakeholders, providing context, depth, and nuanced insights that numerical data alone could not convey. This methodological triangulation provided a more dependable and valid understanding of the research issue, enabling the interpretation of findings through both empirical data and human experiences.

3.2 Data Sources

The study combined primary and secondary data sources to enhance validity through cross-validation. Climate data were sourced from the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) for the period from 2000 to 2023, which included annual records of rainfall, temperature trends, and desertification patterns in the Northwestern states. These data were essential for evaluating environmental stressors and their potential effects on livelihoods. Socio-economic indicators, such as poverty rates, unemployment figures, and household income trends, were obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) for the period 2010–2023, offering insights into the changing economic conditions of the region. Crime and conflict data came from records of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) project, documenting reported cases of armed banditry, cattle rustling, and kidnapping incidents over the last ten years. To augment these secondary datasets, qualitative interviews were held

with 45 purposively selected respondents from Zamfara, Katsina, and Sokoto States. Participants included community leaders, displaced individuals, and local government officials, ensuring a representation of diverse viewpoints on the causes and effects of climate change, poverty, and insecurity in the region.

3.3 Analytical Framework

Analysis was directed by a Climate–Poverty–Conflict Nexus Model, which illustrates the connections between environmental changes, socio-economic deprivation, and violent conflict. This model was utilised to trace causal pathways and feedback loops that sustain fragility in Northwest Nigeria. For the qualitative data, a thematic analysis method was employed, which involved transcribing, coding, and categorising interview responses to identify recurring themes and emerging patterns. For the quantitative data, regression trend analysis was applied to explore the strength and direction of relationships among climatic stress indicators (such as rainfall reduction and temperature increase), poverty rates, and recorded crime incidents. This dual analytical method enabled the study to capture both statistical relationships and the underlying socio-political dynamics, resulting in a more thorough and integrated interpretation of the findings.



Figure 1: Climate Change- Conflicts- Crime- Poverty Model

Figure 1 illustrates that one of the primary factors contributing to rural instability is the increasing impact of climate change and environmental pressures. Extended drought periods, erratic rainfall patterns, soil degradation, and rising temperatures collectively exert significant strain on the natural environment. These alterations directly compromise agricultural yields and diminish grazing land availability, jeopardising the sustainability of farming and pastoral livelihoods. Consequently, traditional rural economies that rely heavily on natural resources are becoming increasingly vulnerable, resulting in widespread fragility among affected communities.

The effects of environmental strain are most clearly seen in the breakdown of agricultural and pastoral economies. With diminishing crop yields and restricted grazing options, many families find it increasingly difficult to support themselves. This results in lower income levels, heightened unemployment, and intensifying poverty. Food insecurity emerges as a prevalent issue, compelling families to resort to

unsustainable survival tactics. The decline of livelihoods further diminishes community resilience, rendering households less capable of coping with future shocks. Thus, poverty acts as both a driver and a result of environmental stress, trapping communities in a cycle of hardship.

As economic opportunities dwindle, desperation often leads individuals—especially young men—to partake in illegal activities. Crime becomes a viable means of survival, with cattle rustling, armed robbery, and kidnapping for ransom becoming common dangers. These activities not only offer short-term benefits for offenders but also deepen insecurity within rural regions. Organised criminal factions exploit this desperation, enlisting at-risk youth and taking advantage of ineffective governance systems. Over time, the rise of crime further destabilises rural areas, eroding trust, safety, and development possibilities.

The increase in crime and insecurity frequently results in violent clashes, particularly between farming and herding communities. These conflicts lead to significant population displacement, forcing individuals to leave their homes, farms, and livestock behind. Displacement disrupts agricultural activities, depriving families of their sources of income and worsening food insecurity. Furthermore, the collapse of social networks and the decline of trust between communities weaken mutual resilience and perpetuate cycles of violence. Ultimately, displacement not only intensifies poverty but also fragments social unity, complicating peacebuilding and recovery efforts.

Cycle & Feedback Loops: A continuous cycle narrative connects the four elements: Climate Change → Poverty → Conflict/Insecurity → Weak Institutions → back to Climate Change. Climate Change disrupts farming productivity, water availability, and livelihoods. Increasing temperatures, floods, and droughts reduce food supplies and income opportunities, particularly for rural populations that depend on agriculture.

Poverty intensifies as households experience income loss, face food scarcity, and struggle to adapt. Limited resources compel vulnerable groups into survival strategies that often harm the environment (such as deforestation and overgrazing), further aggravating climate stress.

Conflict/Insecurity arises when competition for limited resources (land, water, grazing areas) intensifies among farmers, herders, and communities. Poverty increases the likelihood of youth being recruited by armed groups, escalating violence and hindering local economies.

Weak Institutions find it challenging to address disputes, implement climate adaptation strategies, or provide social support. Corruption, ineffective governance, and insufficient capacity prevent communities from building resilience. This institutional weakness allows conflict to endure and adaptation efforts to falter.

The cycle loops back to Climate Change, as fragile institutions and ongoing conflict obstruct investments in sustainable practices, aggravate environmental degradation, and elevate the likelihood of climate shocks—thus perpetuating the cycle.

This creates a self-reinforcing vicious cycle where climate shocks lead to poverty, poverty drives conflict, conflict weakens institutions, and weak institutions diminish the capacity to address climate shocks, effectively closing the loop.

4. Findings

This section presents the outcomes of the mixed-methods analysis, which combines climate, socio-economic, and conflict data with qualitative perspectives gathered from field interviews conducted in Zamfara, Katsina, and Sokoto States. The findings are organised into four thematic areas, reflecting the climate–poverty–conflict nexus observed in Northwest Nigeria.

4.1 Climate Change Trends

Quantitative analysis of data from the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet, 2000–2023) reveals significant climatic shifts in the Northwest. Average annual rainfall has declined by approximately 17% over the past two decades, while the mean annual temperature has increased by 1.4°C. The frequency of extreme heat days (above 40°C) has also increased, placing stress on both crops and livestock.

Table 4.1: Climate Change Indicators in Northwest Nigeria (2000–2023)

| Indicator | 2000–2005 Avg. | 2018–2023 Avg. | % Change |
|------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------|
| Annual Rainfall (mm) | 835 | 693 | -17% |
| Mean Annual Temperature (°C) | 29.3 | 30.7 | +4.8% |
| Days > 40°C per year | 18 | 29 | +61% |
| Grazing Land Area (sq km) | 48,200 | 39,450 | -18% |

Desert encroachment, primarily from the Sahara’s southward advance, has reduced available grazing land. This has intensified seasonal migration by pastoralist groups into farming zones, often without adequate conflict mediation structures.

Interview Insight – Community Leader, Zamfara:

“Twenty years ago, our grazing fields were enough for both local herders and visiting ones. Now, the land has shrunk, and the grass dies early. It forces the herders to move further south, where farmers see them as invaders.”

4.2 Poverty Intensification

Data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2010–2023) indicate a significant increase in poverty headcount ratios across the Northwest. Rural households have been disproportionately affected, with limited access to diversified income sources.

Table 4.2: Poverty Trends in Northwest Nigeria

| Year | Poverty Headcount Ratio (%) | Rural (%) | Urban (%) |
|------|-----------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| 2010 | 62.1 | 68.3 | 49.2 |
| 2015 | 66.8 | 72.5 | 54.7 |
| 2020 | 70.2 | 75.6 | 58.4 |
| 2023 | 72.4 | 78.2 | 60.1 |

Qualitative interviews reveal a strong perception that climate change is a primary driver of livelihood collapse. Declining crop yields due to reduced rainfall and erratic planting seasons have been reported, alongside reduced livestock productivity from heat stress and grazing land loss.

Interview Insight – Displaced Farmer, Katsina:

“When the rains used to come in time, we planted millet and maize without fear. Now, the rains come late and end early. Sometimes, everything dries up before harvest. That is when hunger becomes our companion.”

4.3 Crime Escalation

Police and Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) records show that incidents of armed banditry, cattle rustling, and kidnapping have risen sharply in the last decade, particularly after 2015.

Table 4.3: Recorded Crime Incidents in Northwest Nigeria (2015–2023)

| Year | Armed Banditry | Cattle Rustling | Kidnapping |
|------|----------------|-----------------|------------|
| 2015 | 112 | 85 | 47 |
| 2018 | 245 | 162 | 91 |
| 2020 | 311 | 190 | 144 |
| 2023 | 381 | 203 | 162 |

Between 2015 and 2023, the number of armed banditry incidents increased by over 240%. Interviews highlight how economic desperation has driven youth participation in criminal networks, where quick monetary returns from ransom payments and livestock theft provide an alternative to subsistence farming.

Interview Insight – Local Government Official, Sokoto:

“For many young men, joining a gang means feeding their families today, even if it costs them tomorrow. Poverty has made crime look like the only job available.”

4.4 The Poverty–Conflict Loop

Regression trend analysis confirms a statistically significant relationship between climatic stress indicators (rainfall decline, temperature rise) and both poverty rates and crime incidents. The estimated model is:

$$\text{Crime}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Rainfall}_t + \beta_2 \text{Temperature}_t + \beta_3 \text{PovertyRate}_t + \epsilon_t$$

Where:

Rainfall has a negative coefficient (-0.42, $p < 0.01$), indicating that reduced rainfall is associated with higher crime incidents.

Temperature has a positive coefficient (+0.37, $p < 0.05$), indicating that heat stress is associated with an increase in crime.

The poverty rate has a strong positive coefficient (+0.58, $p < 0.01$), reinforcing the link between deprivation and criminality.

Table 4.4: Regression Results – Climate, Poverty, and Crime Nexus

| Variable | Coefficient | Std. Error | p-value |
|--------------|-------------|------------|---------|
| Rainfall | -0.42 | 0.13 | 0.004 |
| Temperature | +0.37 | 0.15 | 0.021 |
| Poverty Rate | +0.58 | 0.14 | 0.000 |
| Constant | 2.17 | 0.89 | 0.018 |

$R^2 = 0.74$

The feedback loop identified is as follows:

Climatic Challenges → Loss of Livelihoods → Increase in Poverty → Rise in Crime and Conflict → Displacement and Additional Livelihood Loss
 Interview Insight – Displaced Woman, Zamfara: “When the bandit groups attacked, we fled with nothing. Our agricultural lands are now barren. Lacking farmland to cultivate, we rely on aid, leaving our sons vulnerable to the allure of joining those who forced us away.” The displacement resulting from banditry diminishes agricultural productivity by both taking away the workforce from farms and leaving farmlands abandoned, which are then at risk of further environmental degradation.

4.5 Summary of Combined Findings

1. Climate Change is intensifying environmental degradation and limiting accessible resources, directly instigating conflicts between pastoralists and farmers.
2. Poverty levels have worsened due to the collapse of rural livelihoods, with rural poverty rates exceeding 78% as of 2023.
3. Crime has surged significantly, driven by economic hardship and the enticement of illegal income.
4. The cycle of poverty and conflict is self-perpetuating, complicating recovery without concurrent efforts in climate adaptation, poverty alleviation, and security interventions.

5. DISCUSSION

The results support established theories that link environmental pressure to conflict, but emphasise a crucial compounding factor in Northwest Nigeria: the influence of organised crime in intensifying the poverty–conflict cycle. Climate-induced livelihood failures do not automatically result in conflict in every situation. However, in scenarios with weak governance and established crime networks, the shift from environmental distress to armed conflict becomes more plausible. Additionally, the displacement of farming and herding populations not only exacerbates food insecurity but also weakens social unity, creating a conducive environment for ongoing instability. Without strategies that address both

environmental and socio-economic weaknesses, implementing climate adaptation initiatives in isolation is unlikely to mitigate fragility.

6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusion

The vulnerability of Northwest Nigeria arises from a complex interaction of climate change, poverty, and crime, which together perpetuate a harmful cycle of conflict. Climate-related stress increases insecurity in livelihoods, which incites criminal behaviour and violence, further entrenching poverty.

Recommendations

1. Climate-Resilient Livelihoods: Introduce drought-resistant crop initiatives and sustainable grazing practices.
2. Community-Based Security: Enhance local security measures with governmental support to fight rural banditry.
3. Integrated Poverty Alleviation: Merge social protection initiatives with vocational training for youth in impacted regions.
4. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Establish formal platforms for mediation between farmers and herders, supported by legal frameworks.
5. Environmental Rehabilitation: Initiate extensive afforestation and soil recovery projects in areas prone to desertification.

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